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An Agent-Based Cockpit Task Management System
The objectives of this research were to develop and evaluate an agent-based program to facilitate Cockpit
Task Management (CTM) in commercial transpart aircralL During the course of this research we refined
the concept of CTM and renamed it Agenda Management (AMgt). We developed an agent-based program
called the AgendaMauager (AMgr) and evaluated it in a part-task simulator study using airline pilots.
Results from the study indicate that the AMgr was in fact effective in facilitating AMgt.
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Cockpit task management (CTM) is the management level activity pilots perform as
they initiate, monitor, prioritize, and terminate cockpit tasks. To better understand the
nature and significance of this process, we conducted 3 empirical studies: a review
of National Transportation Safety Board aircraft accident reports, a review of Avia-
tion Safety Reporting System aircraft incident reports, and a simulator experiment.
In the accident report study, we determined that CTM errors occurred in 76 (23%) of
the 324 accidents we reviewed. We found CTM errors in 231 (49%) of the 470
incident reports we reviewed. In the simulator study, we found that CTM performance
was inversely related to workload. We conclude that CTM is significant to flight
safety and recommend that this realization be reflected in pilot training, in cockpit
procedures, and in research to develop pilot aiding systems.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Ken Funk, Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering, Oregon
State University, 118 Covell Hall, Corvallis, OR 97331-2407.
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Flight crews not only have to perform individual tasks to accomplish missions; they
must manage tasks as well. They must make sure that tasks are started and stopped
at the right times and that undue attention to lower priority tasks does not prevent
the correct and timely completion of higher priority tasks. Just as failure to perform
tasks correctly can lead to accidents, failure to manage tasks correctly can have
catastrophic consequences as well.
This article describes three related studies that have helped us to understand the
nature and significance of task management in commercial flight operations: a study
of aircraft accidents, a study of aircraft incidents, and a study of task management
behavior in the laboratory.
BACKGROUND
We define a task as a process performed (at least partly by a human) to achieve a
goal, such as to fly to a waypoint, descend to a desired altitude, obtain a clearance
from air traffic control, or restart an engine. Most human factors and engineering
psychology researchers have focused on the task as the unit of human behavior,
and many theories of task performance and errors have emerged.
A less prominent line of research has addressed the higher level activity of
managing multiple, concurrent tasks. For example, Johannsen and Rouse (1979)
introduced the notion of a time-sharing computer system as a metaphor for human
multiple task performance but did not address in any detail the nature of the
executive task, that task responsible for managing other tasks. In her studies of
workload, Hart (1989) fou,tad that participants attempted to maintain a relatively
constant level of workload by means of a form of task management: shedding or
assuming tasks as workload increased or decreased. Moray and his colleagues
(1991) proposed scheduling theory as a normative model for how operators manage
multiple tasks and found that unaided human participants adopted suboptimal
scheduling strategies. In a simulator study, Raby and Wickens (1994) investigated
the effect of workload on task management, finding that as workload increased,
participants adjusted task performance strategies.
Our research is based on a theory developed by Funk (1991) to describe task
management behavior in the cockpit domain. According to this theory, cockpit task
management (CTM) consists of the following functions:
1. Task initiation: The initiation of tasks when appropriate conditions exist.
2. Task monitoring: The assessment of task progress and status.
3. Task prioritization: The assignment of priorities to tasks relative to their
importance and urgency for the safe completion of the mission.
4. Resource allocation: The assignment of human and machine resources to
tasks so that they may be completed.
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5. Task interruption: The temporary suspension of lower priority tasks so that
resources may be allocated to higher priority tasks.
6. Task resumption: The resumption of interrupted tasks when priorities
change or resources become available.
7. Task termination: The termination of tasks that have been completed, that
cannot be completed, or that are no longer relevant.
Objectives
The broad purpose of our research was to determine the nature and significance of
CTM in flight operations and, if appropriate, make recommendations to improve
it. To achieve this, the following specific objectives were formulated:
1. Develop a taxonomy of CTM errors.
2. Study CTM behavior in operational settings by means of accident and
incident reports.
3. Study CTM behavior under controlled laboratory conditions.
4. Make recommendations to improve CTM behavior through training and
design.
The organization of this article follows that of the objectives.
CTM Error Classification
Chou and Funk (1990) developed an initial CTM error taxonomy consisting of
seven general CTM error categories corresponding to the aforementioned seven
functions of CTM. Each category was further described in terms of specific error
classes. Use of the initial taxonomy in preliminary analyses of accident and incident
reports showed some of the error classes to be redundant and the taxonomy, as a
whole, to be difficult to apply consistently.
As a result, we revised the taxonomy to include the CTM error categories shown
in Table 1. To summarize, a task may be initiated or terminated too early, too late,
under incorrect conditions, or for incorrect reasons; or it may not be initiated or
terminated at all. Furthermore, a task may be given too high or too low a priority.
This revised taxonomy served as the basis for our accident and incident studies,
descriptions of which follow.
CTM Errors in Aircraft Accidents
The underlying causes of aircraft accidents usually fall into the three broad
categories of mechanical factors, weather, and pilot error. However, these labels
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TABLE 1
CTM Error Taxonomy
Error Categories Possible Classifications
Task initiation Early
Late
Incorrect
Lacking
Task prioritization Incorrect
Task termination Early
Late
Incorrect
Lacking
should not be used to mark the end of further analyses for human and other system
performance errors because aircraft accidents are usually the outcomes of a number
of contributing factors. In an effort to determine whether some instances of pilot
error could be explained in terms of CTM, and thereby begin to understand the
significance of CTM to flight safety, we reviewed a set of aircraft accident reports
(Chou, 1991).
Our analysis reflects the examination of the abstracts of 324 National Transpor-
tation Safety Board (NTSB) aircraft accident reports concerning accidents occur-
ring between 1960 and 1989. After reviewing the 324 National Technical Informa-
tion Service abstracts of these reports, we removed accidents that were obviously
unrelated to this study from the screening process. For example, accidents due
primarily to weather and mechanical failures were removed. This elimination
process left 76 accident reports for further analysis.
Following the initial screening, we selected a representative set of cases for
further study, based on the following considerations. First, we chose the cases so
as to include a complete set of CTM errors as listed in Table 1. Second, we chose
cases involving conditions we believed we could reconstruct in a simulated envi-
ronment. Based on these considerations, we settled on a set of cases including the
following accidents: Eastern Flight 401, a Lockheed L1011 (NTSB, 1973); China
Airlines Flight 006, a Boeing 747 (NTSB, 1986a); Piedmont Flight 467, a Boeing
737 (NTSB, 1986b); Air Florida Flight 90, a Boeing 737 (NTSB, 1982); Comair
Flight 444, aPA31-310 (NTSB, 1979); and a TexasgulfAviation flight, a Lockheed
JetStar (NTSB, 1981). For each accident in this set, we carefully studied the data
and conclusions of the NTSB investigators and constructed an operational task
context.
Each context was a graphical representation of cockpit activities during the time
leading up to the accident. It included the number and type of concurrent tasks
competing for the flight crew's resources, the state of each task (pending, active,
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interrupted, or terminated), and selected system state variables (e.g., aircraft alti-
tude, speed, etc.).
For example, Figure I shows the task context for Eastern Flight 40 l, a Lockheed
L 1011, in the last 10 min before the accident. In this accident, the flight crew became
preoccupied with a possible landing gear indicator fault and failed to notice the
aircraft's gradual descent, which eventually led to the crash. The upper portion of
this figure shows crew activity on four concurrent tasks in this period: aircraft
control (FLYING), ATC communication (COMM), diagnosis of the landing gear
indicator (DIAGNS), and inspection of crew-accessible parts of the landing gear
itself (INSPCT). The lower portion of the figure shows aircraft altitude and time.
This figure shows our finding that the flight crew's attention was focused on the
landing gear problem to the exclusion of the flight control task.
We identified this as a CTM error and classified it as a task-prioritization-incor-
rect error, backing up our interpretation of the data with the conclusions of the
NTSB. With the insights gained from this detailed analysis and using the data and
conclusions in the accident abstracts and full reports, we identified and classified
80 CTM errors in 76 of the 324 accident reports. That is, we found that CTM errors
occurred in about 23% of the accidents reviewed. These errors, summarized by
category, are presented in Table 2.
TASKS
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FIGURE 1 Task context for Eastern Flight 401.
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TABLE 2
CTM Errors Identified and Classified in 76 (23%) of 324 NTSB Accident Reports
i i i i =
Number of Percentage of Number _ Percentage af
CTM Error Accidents CTM Accidents CTM Errors All CTM Errors
Task initiation 35 46 35 44
Task prioritization 24 32 24 30
Task termination 21 28 21 26
• i
Note. CTM = cockpit task management; NTSB = National Transportation Safety Board. Total
number of CTM errors = 80.
Although we cannot state categorically that CTM errors were the sole or even
primary causes of these accidents, we do believe that they played significant roles.
Had the errors been prevented, the accidents probably would not have occurred.
We conclude that the moderately high incidence of CTM errors in the accidents--76
(23%) of 324 accidentswis supportive evidence that CTM is a significant factor in
flight safety.
CTM Errors in Critical In-Flight Incidents
Fortunately, aircraft accidents are very rare events. Unfortunately, a set of acci-
dents such as the one we studied might be a very biased sample of the operating
environment. Therefore, inferences made from a set of accidents may have little
relevance to reducing the likelihood of future accidents. For that reason, we next
turned our attention to aircraft incidents (Madhavan, 1993). An incident is defined
as "an occurrence other than an accident, associated with the operation of an
aircraft, which affects or could affect the safety of operations" (Federal Aviation
Regulations, 1994). Although incidents by definition do not involve death, serious
injury, or substantial aircraft damage, it is clear in retrospect that most airline
accidents were foreshadowed by clear evidence that the problems existed long
before as incidents. Our specific objective in analyzing aircraft incidents was to
determine the significance of CTM in flight operations more representative of
normal conditions.
We used as a source of aircraft incident information NASA's Aviation Safety
Reporting System (ASRS). The ASRS database consists of anonymous reports filed
by pilots and air traffic controllers describing events in which accidents nearly
occurred or in which flight safety was seriously compromised.
Our preliminary analysis of CTM errors focused on aircraft incident reports
relating to in-flight engine emergencies (99 reports) and controlled flight toward
terrain (CFTT; 205 reports). We found CTM errors in 19% and 54%, of these
reports, respectively. The high incidence of CTM errors in the CFTT reports, as
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well as the fact that over 49% of all airline accidents occur during approach and
landing (Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, 1994, March), caused us to focus
further attention on the terminal phases of flight. At our request the ASRS office
furnished us with 243 additional reports pertaining to these phases.
As in most ASRS studies, we used the narrative section of the reports for our
analysis. The narrative is the section of the report in which the reporter states in his
or her own words what happened and why it happened.
In the narratives, we focused on activities directly related to task management
only. Incidents involving crew personality differences and other sociological
factors were excluded. When narratives were unclear about the specific errors
committed (i.e., no categoric admission of the errors by the reporters), some
inferences were made about the errors based on our knowledge of standard
operating procedures as gleaned from aircraft operations manuals, accident reports,
incident reports, and other aviation literature (e.g., Stewart, 1992). Key words and
phrases in the narratives--such as "forgot," "omitted," "memory lapse," "over-
sight," etc.----enabled us to home in quickly on the error classification. As an
illustration of our method, one such report (typical of the reports in this flight phase),
is reproduced, in part, here (ASRS Rep. No. 144766). This excerpt is verbatim from
the ASRS database except that case has been converted (ASRS reports are recorded
in all uppercase letters). CTM error classifications are inserted in square brackets
and are explained following the excerpt:
Capt. was flying acft. A tornado watch had him worried and asked F/E to contact FSS
to get details descending into DTW [task prioritization incorrect]. His radio interfered
with COM on radio #2 which I was on with APCH. During this confusion dsnt and
apch clrncs had to be repeated a few times distracting my x-chk of cot's INS.
Intercepting LOC capt went right through the LOC and saw he had 66 degs not 33,
as apch calls for. I called out that and he put 33 in the window, corrected back and
overshot again (APCH asked if we needed vectors back for a new apch). He said no.
I said "I don't like the look of this." We had full LOC deflection and were above G/S.
Capt. said "let's see how it is at 1000." At I000' he did manage to get back on LOC
and kept descending to a successful lndg [task termination lack]. Capt. had poor CRM
and poor judgement. I should have said,"go missed apch," F/E should have said the
same, but was still doing chklist--late [task initiation late] because of talking to FSS.
It was the first time I had seen an apch so messed up! I will never allow it to happen
again !t
tCapt., cpt= captain; F/E = flight engineer; FSS = flight service station; APCH = approach control:
apch = approach; dsnt = descent; clrncs = clearances; x-check = cross-check; INS = inertial navigation
system; LOC = localizer; G/S = glide slope; Indg = landing; CRM = crew resource management; chklist
= checklist.
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The captain elected to perform a lower priority task (radio for weather update)
at a critical point in the flight (final approach to land), which caused the F/E to delay
his checklist. The reporter implied that the captain should have aborted the landing.
From the narrative it appears that the captain's attention was allocated primarily to
the tornado watch with little left for landing safely (as evidenced by his mis-setting
the localizer course and continuing with the landing despite being at full localizer
deflection).
From the 540 ASRS incident reports we obtained, we eliminated duplicates. We
then applied the CTM error taxonomy to the remaining 470 unique reports. We
found CTM errors in 231 (49%) of the 470 ASRS incident reports. The results of
the analysis are presented in Table 3.
Task initiation appears to be the most significant CTM error category, account-
ing for 42% of the CTM errors identified. Task initiation errors included early
descents, late configurations, and failures to tune navigation and communication
radios. Task prioritization errors accounted for 35% of the CTM errors and
included distractions by weather and traffic watches. The remaining 23% of the
CTM errors were in the task termination category. These included early autopilot
disengagements, altitude overshoots, and improperly continued landings under
unsafe conditions.
Although task initiation appears to be the largest CTM error category, that may
be somewhat misleading. The failure to start a task on time (or at all) or the decision
to start a task too-early may often be explained as misprioritization. That is,
excessive priority placed on one task may delay the start of a second task or cause
the flight crew to start the first task before they should. Similar arguments can be
made for task prioritization versus task termination. Although the initiation and
termination categories are useful for understanding errors, their causes, and their
consequences, task prioritization should perhaps draw our greatest attention for the
development of countermeasures. We conclude that the high incidence of CTM
errors in the incident reports--231 (49%) of 470 reports--is supportive evidence
that CTM is a significant factor in flight safety.
TABLE 3
CTM Ermmldentified and Classifiedin 231(49%)of470 ASRSIncident Repots
Number of Percentage of Number qf Percentage af
CTM Error Incidents CTM Incidents CTM Errors All CTM Errors
Task initiation ! 37 59 145 42
Task prioritization 133 58 122 35
Task termination 83 36 82 23
Note. CTM = cockpit task management; ASRS = Aviation Safety Reporting System. Total number
of CTM errors = 349.
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FLIGHT SIMULATOR STUDY
From our accident and incident studies, we determined that CTM is significant
enough to warrant further study. However, we felt that a different approach was
needed to better understand the nature of CTM behavior. Aircraft accidents are rare
events, thus providing few opportunities for developing insights into error proc-
esses, which are, in any case, very difficult to reconstruct. By the same token, though
ASRS incident reports can provide firsthand information on abnormal cockpit
operations, they are subject to self-reporting biases and other problems. Therefore,
controlled experimentation provides a useful alternative, serving to compensate for
the drawbacks noted previously and to provide an opportunity for objective
observations. An additional advantage of the simulation method is that it enables
observation of how human operators manage tasks under normal conditions.
The main objectives of our experiment were to elicit and observe CTM errors
similar to those identified in the accident and incident analyses and to identify the
factors leading to such errors. Our approach was to have participant pilots fly a
low-fidelity flight simulator in several flight scenarios and observe and analyze
their behavior in managing and performing concurrent flight tasks.
Apparatus
Our flight simulator consisted of three networked personal computers. The system
simulated a generic, two-engine commercial transport aircraft. One computer
simulated aircraft dynamics using a very simple aerodynamic model and produced
a simple primary flight display showing heading, altitude, airspeed, pitch, and roll.
The participant controlled the simulated aircraft by means of a joystick. A second
computer simulated the navigation system and presented a moving map display.
The participant could use the navigation display for planning and navigating
purposes and could control map scale and orientation (north up or track up) by
means of mouse-activated controls. The third computer simulated aircraft subsys-
tems, including engines and the hydraulic system, and generated a simplified engine
indication and crew alerting systerndisplay. Aircraft subsystem models included
failure modes that could be triggered by script files and that required participant
interaction by mouse-activated controls to correct.
Participants
Twenty-four unpaid participants from Oregon State University participated in the
experiment. The participants included 2 engineering faculty members, 3 under-
graduate engineering students, and 19 engineering graduate students. Two of the
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participants had private pilot licenses with 120 to 150 hr of flight time. The other
participants had no flight experience. Sixteen participants participated in two pilot
studies, and the remaining 8 participants took part in the data collection runs. The
pilot studies were used for refining training procedures and flight scenarios.
Procedures
Participants received a 60-min training session prior to each experiment. This
session included viewing a training videotape and running a simplified scenario.
The scenarios were categorized into six different levels by the following inde-
pendent variables: resource requirements, maximum number of concurrent tasks,
and flight path complexity. Following concepts from multiple resource theory
(Wickens, 1992) and workload index (W/INDEX; North & Riley, 1989), scenarios
were created and rated according to the requirements for visual resources (to acquire
needed information from simulated visual displays), manual resources (to manipu-
late simulated controls), and mental resources (to recognize, remember, calculate,
and decide). Each scenario received an aggregate resource requirements rating (low
• or high). The number of concurrent tasks was defined as the maximum number of
tasks requiring participant attention at any point in the scenario (three or six). Flight
path complexity (easy or hard) was varied by adjusting the sharpness of turns at
waypoints in the flight path.
A split-plot design (Steel & Tome, 1980) was used for the experiment. The latter
factors (number of concurrent tasks and flight path complexity) were crossed to
provide four levels for whole unit factors. These four whole unit factors were then
crossed with the subunit levels (resource requirements) to provide eight treatments.
Given this design, eight participants were used to provide two responses for each
treatment. Each participant performed two levels of the subunit factor (low and high
resource requirements), and the assignment of treatments to participants was
randomized to control learning effect. That is, four participants started with the high
resource requirements treatment and then performed the low resource requirement
treatment, whereas the other four participants performed their treatments in the
reverse order.
Performance Measurement
The following performance measures were used:
1. Average response time to system faults.
2. Root-mean-square (RMS) flight path error.
3. Task prioritization score.
4. Number of tasks that were initiated late.
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The response time to a system fault was defined as the time from the occurrence
of the fault (such as an electrical bus fault) until a compensating response was
initiated. This corresponded to task initiation. The task prioritization score was
determined from paired comparisons between tasks and was used for measuring
task prioritization performance. A score of +1 was assigned when a correct
prioritization was made by the participant (i.e., attention was first given to the higher
priority task); otherwise a-1 was assigned. Scores for the remaining tasks were set
to zero. Finally, a task was said to be initiated late if the participant did not respond
to the task 60 sec after it had been activated. This was used to measure task initiation
performance.
Results
The analysis of variance (ANOVA) results for factors with significant effects are
summarized in Table 4. We found that the resource requirements level had a
significant effect on the average task response time. That is, higher resource
requirements increased delays in initiating a task. However, neither combination
of flight path complexity nor maximum number of concurrent tasks (alone or in
combination) had a significant effect on task response time.
During the experiments, participants were warned if 60 sec passed after the
occurrence of a system fault and no actions were taken. Thus, the definition of a
late initiation was failure to initiate the task within 1 min following fault occurrence.
The ANOVA results show that resource requirements had a significant effect on
late task initiation.
Results from the ANOVA show that both resource requirements and the com-
bination of flight path complexity and number of concurrent tasks created signifi-
TABLE 4
Summary of Experimental Results
Response Variables
Experimental Factors
Number of Concurrent
Task._ and Flight Path
Complexity (dr= 3. 4)
Resource
Requiremen ts
(d]= 1.4)
F p F p
Task initiation (average response time)
Task initiation (late task initiation)
Task prioritization
RMS flight parameter errors
5.85 .060
< 6.59 > .05"
32.08 .003
1.26 .400
14.65 .019
27.00 .007
34.13 .004
3.04 . ! 56
*Not significant; exact F and p values were not recorded.
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cant effects on task prioritization. Therefore, task prioritization degrades as either
one of these factors increases.
We calculated the RMS of deviations in flight parameters using data obtained
from whole-mission information. Heading deviations were significantly affected
by the combination of flight path complexity and the number of tasks; changes in
mental resource requirements were significant to the altitude deviation. None of
the other RMS deviations were significantly affected by either the resource require-
ments or the combination of flight path complexity and the number of concurrent
tasks.
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
We developed a taxonomy of CTM errors based on Funk's normative theory of
CTM (Funk, 1991) and applied it in the analysis of NTSB aircraft accident reports
and ASRS incident reports. We found CTM errors in 76 (23%) of the 324 accident
reports analyzed and in 231 (49%) of the 470 incident reports. In a low-fidelity
simulator study, we found that resource requirements (visual, manual, and mental)
had a statistically significant effect on task initiation and task prioritization per-
formance, and that the number of concurrent tasks coupled with flight path
complexity had a statistically significant effect on task prioritization performance.
From our studies of aircraft accidents and incidents, we conclude that CTM is
a significant factor in flight safety. And, as Ruby and Wickens's (1994) results
implied, our experiments confirm that increased resource requirements increase the
likelihood of CTM errors--specifically, late task initiation and incorrect task
prioritization errors.
We offer four recommendations. First, we recommend that pilots receive
instruction concerning CTM and how to avoid CTM errors. More specifically,
pilots should be made aware that in periods of high workload, when large numbers
of concurrent tasks are competing for their attention, there is danger that they will
not initiate important tasks promptly and that their attention will be drawn away
from safety-critical tasks. Presumably, pilots can be taught to recognize these
precursor conditions and to develop personal strategies to avoid CTM errors when
these conditions are present. CTM instruction might most naturally fit into existing
crew resource management training programs.
This recommendation is based on the assumption that our experimental envi-
ronment, involving a low-fidelity simulator and (mostly) nonpilot participants is,
at a very high level of abstraction, similar enough to the real commercial transport
aircraft environment to warrant extrapolation. This assumption should be tested, so
our second recommendation is that further studies of CTM be conducted using
full-mission scenarios in high-fidelity training simulators with line pilots as par-
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ticipants. The objectives should be to validate our earlier findings, to search for
other factors affecting CTM performance, to identify patterns of both good and bad
CTM, and to attempt to link CTM errors with human cognitive characteristics, such
as short-term (working) memory limitations.
Third, we recommend that research be conducted to develop and evaluate formal
cockpit procedures to facilitate CTM performance, based on findings from the
studies recommended previously. Such procedures might, for example, involve
memory aids and elaborated versions of the well-known pilots' prioritization
maxim: "aviate--navigate-----communicate."
Finally, our fourth recommendation is that research be conducted to develop and
evaluate a computational aid to facilitate CTM performance: a Cockpit Task
Management System (CTMS). A CTMS might, for example, perform the following
functions:
1. Maintain a current model of aircraft state and current cockpit tasks.
2. Monitor task state and status.
3. Compute task priority.
4. Remind the pilots of all tasks that should be in progress.
5. Suggest that the pilots attend to tasks that do not show satisfactory progress.
We must point out, however, that for any approach to be effective, net pilot
workload must not increase. If personal strategies, formal procedures, or computa-
tional aids impose additional mental demands, there must be compensatory work-
load reductions. Otherwise, the supposed aids may actually lead to even worse CTM
performance.
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INTRODUCTION
In an aircraft cockpit, the pilot performs multiple, concurrent tasks to accomplish the flight mission. For
example, the pilot may simultaneously lower the landing gear and eom.mtmieate with air traffic control (ATC)
while maintaining a correct descent rate. The pilot has two principal cockpit roles: controller and manager.
Like a driver in an automobile, the pilot as controller performs operational-level tasks such as
moment-to-moment manual control and activation/deactivation of automatic devices. As system manager, like a
factory manager, the pilot performs such management-level tasks as monitoring system configurations and
overseeing activities. In other words, the pilot is in charge of managing the multiple, concurrent flight tasks.
Funk (1991) referred to this management-level activity as cockpit task management (CTM).
The basis for the present research follows from prior studies of CTM errors by Funk and his colleagues
flunk, 1991; Chou and Funk, 1993; Madhavan and Funk, 1993; Chou, Madhavan, and Funk, in review). Funk
developed a preliminary CTMS theory from the perspective of systems engineering; and Chou (1991) and
Madhavan (1993) reviewed aircraft accident and incident reports, verifying the significance of CTM errors in
those mishaps. To facilitate CTM and to reduce CTM-related pilot errors, the present study has included the
development and evaluation of a prototype aid, the cockpit task management system (CTMS).
BACKGROUND
Cockpit Task Management (CTM)
CTM is "a process by which the flighterew manages an agenda of cockpit tasks" flunk, 1991). CTM
activities include task
1. initiation,
2. monitoring (i.e, assessing task progress and performance),
3. prioritization,
4. resource allocation, and
5. termination.
Errors
CTM errors occur when a flighterew fails to perform CTM functions satisfactorily. Chou, Madhavan, and
Funk (in review) developed a taxonomy of Cockpit Task Management errors consisting of the error categories
1. task initiation (early, late, or incorrect),
2. task prioritization (incorrect), and
3. task termination (early, late, or incorrect).
They then applied this taxonomy in the analysis of National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) aircraft
accident reports and Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) incident reports. They found CTM errors in 76
(23 per cent) of the 324 accident reports analyzed and in 231 (49 per cent) of the 470 incident reports. They
concluded that CTM is a significant factor in flight safety and recommended three general approaches to
improve CTM performance: training, procedures, and direct aiding. In regard to the last approach, they
recommend that research be conducted to develop and evaluate a computational aid to facilitate CTM
performance: a Cockpit Task Management System (CTMS). They recommended that a CTMS
I. maintaina current model of aircraft state and current cockpit tasks,
2. monitor task state and status,
3. compute task priority,
4. remind the pilots of all tasks that should be in progress, and
5. suggest that the pilots attend to tasks that do not show satisfactory progress.
A CTMS can be viewed as an executive associate which would facilitate the pilots' managerial tasks.
Research Objectives
The objectives of the present study were to determine the technical feasibility of a CTMS through the
development of a prototype CTMS and to evaluate CTMS effectiveness for the improvement of CTM
performance.
MEI_OD
A CTMS was designed based upon the above requirements. Concepts of object-oriented design (OOD) and
distributed artificial intelligence (DAI) were employed in developing the CTMS. The CTMS was then
integrated into a PC-based flight simulator for experimental evaluation of system effectiveness. Volunteer
subjects flew scenario simulations both with and without the CTMS. Performance data were collected and
analyzed to evaluate CTMS effectiveness.
Flight Simulator
The flightsimulatorused forthisresearchwas a small,fixed-basedmodel of an aircraftcockpitfora single
pilot,developed by modifying an existingsimulatorused fora previousCTM study (Chou, 1991). The
simulatorconsistedof threepersonalcomputers (eachwith itsown monitor),a computer keyboard,two
trackballs,and a sidestickcontroller.The computers were linkedvia Ethernet,usingthe TCP/IP communication
protocol.
One ofthe computers ran a simple aerodynamic model and provided,via itsmonitor,a primaryflight
displayshowing currentand command heading,airspeed,and altitude;a pitchladderindicatingpitchand roll
angles;aircraftlatitudeand longitude;and autopilotstatus(engaged or disengaged).
The second computer and monitor provided a navigation display (ND) consisting of four panels: a
horizontal situation indicator (FISI), an automatic flight control (AFC) panel, a source select panel, and an air
traffic control (ATC) communication panel. The HSI displayed an aircraft-centered moving map consisting of
an aircraft symbol, the current flight path, and waypoint symbols and names. It also displayed the aircraft
position, active waypoint data, weather radar data, and an expanded compass rose. The AFC and the source
select panels displayed computer-generated button and knob images. These buttons or knobs were used to set
the HSI display or a source selector to the desired mode. A trackball was used to both "push" the buttons and
"turn" the knobs. The ATC communication panel provided a simplified datalink system for alphanumeric, rather
than verbal, communication with a simulated air traffic controller.
The third computer and monitor provided a subsystem display (SD) consisting of six control panels and two
display panels. The SD control panels were used to control such aircraft subsystems as the engine, the hydraulic
system, and the electrical system, as well as the landing gear and flaps. As for the ND, simulated buttons or
knobs in the panels were "pushed" or "turned" using a trackball. The SD display panels provided a simple
EICAS (engine indication and crew alerting system) and synoptic displays of aircraft subsystems such as engine,
fuel system, hydraulic system, electrical system, and landing gear.
CockpitTask Management System (CTMS)
Based on the proposed requirements of Chou, Madhavan, and Funk, specific goals for the development of
the CTMS were established. These were to help the flightcrew prioritize tasks, initiate tasks, terminate tasks,
interrupt tasks, and resume interrupted tasks. To achieve these goals, functional requirements for the CTMS
were established. These were to provide the pilot with information about task state, task status, task priority,
and task relationships.
The CTMS was implemented on a fourth networked personal computer using Smalltalk, an object-oriented
programming language. Concepts of object-oriented design (COD) and distributed artificial intelligence (DAI)
were employed in CTMS implementation.
The CTMS is a knowledge-based system in which problem-solving knowledge is distributed among
software units referred to as "agents." Simulated aircraft subsystems and pilot tasks are represented in the
CTMS by "system agents" (SAs) and "task agents" (TAs), respectively.
System Agents (SA) An SA is a representative of an aircraft subsystem. A subsystem SA receives state
information about its corresponding aircraft subsystem from the flight simulator, releasing this information when
requested. In the CTMS, an SA is implemented by an instance of a Smalltalk class, and the specific behaviors
or knowledge of the SA are implemented in the methods (i.e., procedures) of the class.
Task Agents (TA) Task agents are responsible for monitoring the performance of corresponding flight
tasks. Like SAs, TAs are implemented by an instance of a class, and the specific behavior or knowledge
necessary for each TA is implemented in the methods of the class. This knowledge allows each TA to
determine when its task should be started, when it should be terminated, and how its status (performance --
satisfactory or unsatisfactory) should be assessed.
CTMS Operations As a subject controls the simulator, CTMS SAs maintain knowledge about the current
state of the simulated aircraft, providing that knowledge to TAs on demand. TAs in turn determine when tasks
should be started and stopped and continually assess the status of each task. Higher-level TAs prioritize tasks
based on a pre-defmed priority scheme and identify tasks requiring pilot attention.
From the pilot's perspective, the core unit of the CTMS is its display, which provides information about all
tasks with respect to task state, status, and priority. This color alphanumeric display consists of three sections.
The upcoming task display (UTD) lists those tasks that should be started soon (e.g., an upcoming descent). The
in-progress task display (ITD) lists those tasks that should actually be in progress. The suggested task display
(STD) lists any tasks that require immediate attention due either to poor performance or urgency. With this
three-segment arrangement, task state (upcoming, in-progress, or suggested) is presented using location coding.
Task status (satisfactory performance or unsatisfactory performance) is indicated by the use of color coding.
That is, if the performance on a task is satisfactory, its name is displayed in green; if it is unsatisfactory, a
yellow or red color is used, depending upon the importance of the task.
In addition to task state and status, task priority information is presented on the STD, the topmost of the
three CTMS display sections. That is, names of the suggested tasks (those needing immediate attention) are
listed in order of the priority of the tasks, with higher priority tasks being placed higher in the list.
Experiment
After the CTMS was implemented, an experiment was performed to evaluate its effectiveness in improving
CTM performance. Twelve volunteer subjects were used for the experiment. The first four subjects were used
for a pilot study to cheek the readiness of the experiment and facilitate final refinements, and the remaining
eight subjects were used for the data collection runs.
A balanced experimental design was developed for the data-collection flights. To compare subject
performances between flying with and without the CTMS, each subject flew two data-collection scenarios -- one
with the CTMS and the other without it.
Two different flight scenarios were developed to remove the learning effect that would have resulted from
the use of the same scenario in the two data-collection flights. Each was designed to present the same
complexity to minimize any effect of differences in scenario complexity, which could bias the results of the
experiment.
The experimental procedure was administered in two sessions: a training session and a data-collection
session. After a four-hour first-day training session followed by a two-hour second-day traimng session, each
subject flew two 50-minute data-collection flight scenarios with a 5 to 10 minute break between flights.
Four measurements were considered for the evaluation of subject performance in the flight simulator:
1. task prioritization (i.e., correct or incorrect),
2. pilot response time (e.g., to equipment faults),
3. task completion (i.e., whether or not a task was completed), and
4. aircraft control (i.e., deviation from planned flight path).
The f'trst three of the four measurements reflected the three elements in the CTM error taxonomy discussed
above: task prioritization, task initiation, and task termination, respectively. Subject performances in the use of
aircraft controls, including heading, altitude, and airspeed controls, were measured because they were essential to
the comprehensive measurement of overall pilot performance. Subject performance from the 16 scenario flights
flown by eight subjects was collected for these four performance measures. Simulator log files, which recorded
pilot actions and performance measures, as well as videotapes were used to collect performance data.
RF_I.rLTS
In association with the four performance measurements described above, data for the following four
variables were collected: the ratio of misprioritizations to opportunities for misprioritization, the time required
for subjects to first respond to unsatisfactory flight tasks, the proportion of unsatisfactory aircraft control time
during a flight, and the total number of flight tasks the subjects failed to complete by the end of the flights.
One of the goals of the research was to determine ff the CTMS provided effective flight task assistance
during simulated flights. To arrive at this determination, mean subject performances flying with and without the
CTMS were compared. As shown in Figure 1, when subjects flew with the assistance of the CTMS, the mean
task misprioritization rate was reduced by 41 per cent, the mean subject response time was reduced by 18 per
cent, the exercise of mean unsatisfactory aircraft controls was reduced by 24 per cent, and the average number
of incomplete tasks during simulator flights was reduced by g2 per cent.
In addition to comparing the subject performance averages, a statistical analysis of the collected data using
an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed as an additional means of determining whether use of the
CTMS resulted in improved subject performance. Since the hypothesis test using the ANOVA was based upon
the expectation that performances with the CTMS would be better than performances without the CTMS, a
one-tailed test was employed. A type I error, denoted by or, for both 0.1 and 0.05, was used insofar as this
form has gained acceptance for use in typical statistical analyses. In such analyses, the results of a hypothesis
test are reported as a number called the "p-value" -- a measurement of the credibility of the hypothesis test. A
type I error probability, or, and a p-value are used to determine whether the null hypothesis, denoted by He, can
be rejected. Since the principal concern of this experiment was CTMS effectiveness, as indicated by the
p-values for the treatment effect, only these values are presented (Table 1).
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l_igure 1. Mean subject perfonnance for flights with and without CTMS assistance.
Performance measure p-value Conclusion, a=O.1 Conclusion, ¢z=0.05
Misprioritization 0.066 reject Ho do not reject H 0
Response time 0.093 reject H 0 do not reject H 0
Aircraft controls 0.052 reject Ho do not reject H 0
Incomplete tasks 0.009 reject H o reject Ho
Table 1. ANOVA p-values for twalment effect and hypothesis test results.
From the results of the hypothesis test, the p-value for incomplete tasks indicated that there was significant
improvement for task completion performance when subjects flew with the assistance of the CTMS, whereas the
p-values for the remaining three measurements for task prioritization, task initiation, and aircraft controls
indicate that there is suggestive evidence of performance improvement.
DISCUSSION
These results indicate that the CTMS was effective in improving CTM performance under the experimental
conditions. In other words, they show that if an aid can accurately determine what tasks the pilot is attempting
to complete and how well the tasks are being performed, CTM performance can be facilitated by displaying
relevant task management information, in particular, calling the pilot's attention to tasks which are not being
performed in a satisfactory or timely manner. That the CTMS was successful in this is due in large part to the
simplicity of the simulated aircraft, environment, and tasks.
Nevertheless, the findings do point to the potential benefit of such an aid. Past and ongoing research in
intent inferencing (Hoshstrasser and Geddes, 1989), activity tracking (Callantine and Mitchell, 1994), and hazard
monitoring (Skidmore et al, in press) in higher fidelity environments indicates that at least some of the benefits
accruing from the CTMS under laboratory conditions may well be obtainable in more realistic environments.
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1. Introduction
In today's highly automated aircraft, the role of the
pilot has changed from an airplane controller to a
system manager. As a system manager in a cockpit,
today's pilot is in charge of a supervisory activity we
call cockpit task management (CTM). CTM activities
include the initiation, assessment, prioritization,
execution, and termination of tasks.
This paper describes our past and ongoing efforts to
understand CTM and to facilitate it through the use of
agent-based, computational aids.
2. The Task Suppofl System
We became aware of the need for a concept such as
CTM as we developed the Task Support System (Tss),
part of an experimental avionics package for a military
aircraft [1].
knowledge about the aircraft and its environment for
other parts of the TSS. Task agents represented
cockpit tasks. Each task agent had a knowledge base
that helped it determine when a task should be
performed and how to work cooperatively with the
pilot to complete it successfully. High level task
agents used their knowledge bases to help prioritize
tasks. We implemented the TSS on an 80386-based
personal computer in Objective-C, an object-oriented
superset of the C programming language.
Evaluation
We evaluated the TSS in a simulator experiment in
which 16 military pilots flew simulated missions in
both baseline (no TSS) and enhanced (with TSS)
cockpits. With the enhanced cockpit, overall task
performance improved 38%, workload (as measured by
NASA-TLX) was reduced by 13%, and pilot-perceived
effectiveness improved by 83%. 81% of the pilots
preferred the enhanced cockpit to the baseline.
Obje©lives
The purpose of the TSS was to help military pilots
execute tasks quickly and correctly. But as we worked
on the TSS, we found that it was just as important to
help the pilot manage tasks, for even a well-performed
task does little towards mission success if it is the
wrong task or if higher priority tasks are neglected.
Simulator Envimnmant
We developed the TSS for a simulator representing a
single-seat military aircraft and its tactical
environment. The simulator was implemented on a
Silicon Graphics Iris computer.
Architeetune and Implementation
Due to the complexity of the cockpit environment, we
used methods of distributed artificial intelligence to
implement the TSS. Its major components were
intelligent agents: software modules which represented
significant elements of the cockpit and its environment,
having adequate declarative and procedural knowledge
to deal with subsets of the problem domain. System
agents represented aircraft subsystems. They
monitored subsystem data and maintained declarative
Limitations
Although most improvements were statistically
significant, conclusive evidence of the success in
improving CTM performance, especially m an
operational setting, was not demonstrated. First, at
that time, we had established no objective measures of
CTM performance. Second, as the TSS was not the
only element in the enhanced cockpit, it was not
possible to separate out its effects. Third, the
simulator environment was of low fidelity and the
possibility of successful integration of the TSS into an
operational aircraft was by no means assured.
3. The Cockpit Task Management System
Cockpit Task Management
Following the successful demonstration of the TSS, we
formalized the notion of CTM around the following
concepts[2]. A goal is a desired aircraft or system
state. A task is a process to achieve a goal. CTM is
the process of initiating, monitoring, prioritizing, and
terminating tasks. Next we began studies of CTM in
the commercial aviation domain to determine its
significance to flight safety.
in Proceedings of the 1995 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics. Piscataway, NJ:
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Wedeveloped a CTM error taxonomy and, in a study
of 324 US National Transportation Safety Board
aircraft accident reports, found CTM errors in 29 per
cent of the accidents [3, 4]. Using a simplified error
taxonomy, in an analysis of 470 Aviation Safety
Reporting System incident reports, we found CTM
errors in almost 50 percent of the incidents [4, 5].
Concluding that CTM was indeed a significant factor
in flight safety, we developed a prototype pilot vehicle
aid called the Cockpit Task Management System
(CTMS) to facilitate CTM [6].
Objectives
The objectives of this part of our study were to
determine the feasibility of CTMS implementation
through the development of a prototype CTMS and to
evaluate CTMS effectiveness in the improvement of
CTM performance.
Simula_ r Environment
The flight simulator used for this research was a small,
fixed-based model of an aircraft cockpit for a single
pilot. We developed it by modifying the existing
flight simulator used for a previous CTM study [2].
The simulator consisted of three personal computers,
each with its own monitor, a computer keyboard, two
trackballs, and a sidestiek controller. All of the
simulator computers were linked via Ethemet, using
the TCP/IP communication protocol.
The top monitor was a simulated head up display
(HUD) showing aircraft heading, airspeed, and altitude;
a pitch ladder; aircraft horizontal location; and
autopilot status (i.e. engaged or disengaged). The
bottom left monitor, called the navigation display
(ND), showed aircraft horizontal position on a moving
map display and provided a simple datalink system for
simulated air traffic control (ATC) communication.
The subsystem display (SD) on the right monitor
showed synoptic displays of several simulated aircraft
subsystems such as engines, a hydraulic system, and
an electrical system. It also provided an interface for a
simple flight path management system and warning
and alerting displays.
Al_hiteeture and Implementation
Our goals for the CTMS were that it should help the
pilot initiate, monitor, prioritize, and terminate tasks.
To achieve these goals, we determined that the CTMS
should provide information about task state (upcoming,
active, terminated), status (satisfactory or unsatisfactory
performance), and priority.
We implemented the CTMS using Smalltalk, an
object-oriented computer programming language. As
for TSS development, we used concepts of
object-oriented design and distributed artificial
intelligence in the CTMS implementation, where
aircraft subsystems and flight tasks were represented
by conceptual software units referred to as agents. In
the CTMS, aircraft subsystems and pilot tasks were
represented by system agents (SAs) and task agents
(TAs), respectively. The CTMS was an
object-oriented, agent-based system in which
problem-solving knowledge was distributed among
SAs and TAs.
System Agent (SAs): An SA was a representative
of an aircraft subsystem. A subsystem SA received
state information about its corresponding aircraft
subsystem from the flight simulator, releasing this
information when requested. For the CTMS, an SA
was implemented as an instance of a class, and the
specific behaviors or knowledge of the SA were
implemented in the methods of the class. Table 1
provides a partial list of simulated aircraft subsystems
and the corresponding Smalltalk SA classes.
Aircraft Subsystem Class
airframe
left, right engine
hydraulic system
autopilot
electric power system
fuel system
landing gear
flaps
electrical input unit
flight director
inertial reference system
navigation computer
AirframeAgent
EngineAgent
HydraulicSystemAgent
AutopilotAgent
ECSAgent
FuelSystemAgent
Landing0earAgent
FlapAgent
EIUAgent
FDAgent
IRSAgent
NavigationAgent
Table 1. Partial list of simulator subsystems and
CTMS SA classes.
Task Agents (TAs)
Task agents were responsible for helping the pilot
perform corresponding flight tasks. Like SAs, TAs
were implemented as instances of Smalltalk classes,
and the specific behavior or knowledge necessary for
each TA was implemented in the methods of the class.
Table 2 provides a partial list of flight tasks and the
corresponding Smalltalk TA classes.
CTMS Operation
Each TA used information from SAs and its own
procedural knowledge to determine the state of its task:
latent (not imminent), upcoming (imminent),
in-progress, suggested (requiring immediate attention),
or finished. Task status (satisfactory or unsatisfactory)
was determined in a similar way.
Flight Task Class
climb ClimbAgent
cruise CruiseAgent
descent DescentAgent
approach ApproachAgent
land LandAgent
fly_to_a_position FlySegmentAgent
maintain_heading ManageControlAgent
maintain_altitude ManageControlAgent
maintain_airspeed ManageControlAgent
maintain_flap ManageControlAgent
manage_contingency ManageContingeneyAgent
Table 2. Partial list of flight tasks and CTMS TA
classes.
The CTMS display provided information about all
tasks with respect to the following four characteristics:
(a) state, Co) status, (c) priority, and (d) task-subtask
relationship. The display consisted of three sections:
(a) UTD (upcoming task display), (b) ITD (in-progress
task display), and (c) STD (suggested task display),
with task information provided on the corresponding
display sections. That is, task state information was
presented using location coding.
Task status was either satisfactory or unsatisfactory
and indicated by the use of color coding. That is, if a
task was being performed satisfactorily, a green color
was used; if its performance was unsatisfactory, a
yellow or red color was used, depending upon severity.
In addition to taskstate and status, task priority
information was presented on the STD. That is, names
of the suggested tasks were displayed according to the
priority of the tasks, with higher priority tasks being
placed higher in the list. Using the UTD or ITD, the
upcoming and in-progress tasks, respectively, were
displayed in hierarchical structure.
Experiment
After the CTMS was implemented and interfaced to
the flight simulator, an experiment was performed to
evaluate its effectiveness in improving CTM
performance. Twelve volunteer subjects were used for
the experiment. The first four subjects were used for a
pilot study to check the readiness of the experiment,
and the remaining eight subjects were used for the
experimental data collection test runs.
We developed a balanced experimental design for the
data-collection flights. To compare subject
performances between flying with and without the
CTMS, each subject flew two data-collection scenarios
-- one with the CTMS and the other without it. We
developed two different flight scenarios, A and B, to
avoid the learning effect that would have resulted from
the use of an identical scenario in the two
data--collection flights. We designed each to present
the same complexity to minimize the effect by the
differences in scenario complexity, which could have
biased the results of the experiment.
We administered the experimental procedure in two
lengthy sessions: a training session and a
data-collection session. After a four-hour first-day
training session followed by a two-hour second-day
training session, each subject flew two 50-minute
data-collection flight scenarios with a 5 to 10 minute
break between flights.
We used four measurements for the evaluation of
subject performance in the flight simulator: (a) task
prioritization, (b) pilot response time, (e) aircraft
controls, and (d) task completion. Three of the four
measurements, task prioritization, pilot response time,
and task completion, reflected the three elements in
our CTM error taxonomy: task prioritization, task
initiation, and task termination, respectively. Subject
performance in aircraft control (heading, altitude, and
airspeed) was assessed as a comprehensive
measurement of overall pilot performance. Pilot
performance data from the 16 scenario flights flown by
eight subjects were collected for these four
performance measures. Simulator log files (containing
recorded pilot actions and performance) and videotapes
were used to collect performance data.
Resets
These files and tapes allowed us to compute four
performance measures: (a) the ratio of task
misprioritizations to opportunities for misprioritization,
(b) the time required for subjects to first respond to
unsatisfactory tasks, (e) the proportion of
unsatisfactory aircraft control time during a flight, and
(d) the total number of tasks the subjects failed to
complete by the end of the flights.
As shown in Figure 1, when subjects flew with the
assistance of the CTMS, the mean task
misprioritization rate was reduced by 41 per cent, the
mean subject response time was reduced by 18 per
cent, the exercise of mean unsatisfactory aircraft
controls was reduced by 24 per cent, and the average
number of incomplete tasks during simulator flights
was reduced by 82 per cent.
In addition to comparing the subject performance
averages, we performed a statistical analysis of the
collected data using an analysis of variance (ANOVA).
Since the hypothesis test using the A.NOVA was based
upon the expectation that performances with the CTMS
wouldbe better than performances without the CTMS,
we employed a one-tailed test. We considered the
probability of a type I error, denoted by a, of both 0.1
and 0.05, insofar as this form has gained acceptance
foruse intypicalstatisticalnalyses.In such analyses,
the results of a hypothesis test are reported as a
number called the p-value -- a measurement of the
credibility of the hypothesis test. A type I error
probability, a, and a p-value are used to determine
whether the nullhypothesis, denoted by Ho, can be
rejected. Since the principal concern of this
experiment was CTMS effectiveness, as indicated by
the p-values for the treatment effect, we present only
these values in Table 3.
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Figure 1. Mean subject performance with and without
CTMS assistance (normalized).
Measure
For oc=O.1 For cc=0.05
p conclude conclude
Misprioritization 0.066 reject Ho do not reject Ho
Response time 0.093 reject Ho do not reject Ho
Aircraft controls 0.052 reject H° do not reject Ho
Incomplete tasks 0.009 reject Ho reject H°
Table 3. A_NOVA p values for treatment effect and
hypothesis test results. Ho is the hypothesis that the
CTMS did not improve performance.
From the results of the hypothesis test, the p-value for
incomplete tasks indicated that there was significant
improvement for task completion performance when
subjects flew with the assistance of the CTMS,
whereas the p-values for the remaining three
measurements for task prioritization, task initiation,
and aircraft controls were suggestive with respect to
evidence of performance improvement.
Limitatiom
These results indicate that the CTMS was effective in
improving CTM performance under the experimental
conditions. In other words, they show that if an aid
can accurately determine what tasks the pilot is
attempting to complete and how well the tasks are
being performed, CTM performance can be facilitated
by displaying relevant task management information,
in particuaar, calling the pilot's attention to tasks which
are not being performed in a satisfactory or timely
manner. That the CTMS was successful in this is due
in large part to the simplicity of the simulated aircraft,
environment, and tasks.
4. The AgendaManager
Agenda Management
Recent developments and events require that we
broaden the concept of CTM to address issues that are
now arising in commercial aviation. First, human
pilots are no longer the only actors in the cockpit.
Autopilots, thrust management computers, and flight
path management systems are playing more and more
active roles in the control of advanced technology
commercial aircraft. Like human actors, these machine
actors are goal-directed systems that use complex data
or knowledge bases to determine their behaviors.
As the term task is often reserved only for functions
performed by humans [7], it now seems to us wiser to
call a process performed to achieve a goal a function
rather than a task. Therefore the management of
activities in the modern cockpit must address both
human and machine functions.
Second, several recent accidents involving advanced
technology aircraft have been due in part to human
actors (pilots) working at cross-purpose with machine
actors (autopilots). In other words, goal conflicts
between actors -- especially when the human actors
were not aware of the conflicts -- contributed to event
sequences leading up to the accidents.
Based on these two considerations and the
understanding that these concepts apply beyond just
the cockpit environment, we have chosen to extend our
study of Cockpit Task Management to that of Agenda
Management, the management of goals and functions,
the actors who perform those functions, and the
resources that they use.
Objectives
The objectives of our current efforts are to develop and
evaluate an aid to facilitate Agenda Management in a
simulated cockpit environment of higher fidelity than
that of either the TSS or CTMS. We refer to the aid,
now under development, as the AgendaManager.
SimulatorEnvironment
The environment for the AgendaManager is a part-task
simulator based on -- and using software components
from -- the Advanced Concepts Flight Simulator
(ACFS) of the Man-Vehicle Systems Research Facility
at the NASA Ames Research Center. The ACFS is a
full-cockpit, motion-base simulator that models a
hypothetical two engine turbojet transport with all-
electronic displays and autoflight and flight
management systems based on those of current Boeing
aircraft.
The part-task version of the ACFS we are developing
runs on one or two Silicon Graphics Indigo 2
computers and provides a simplified aerodynamic
model, autoflight system, primary flight displays, and
system synoptic displays. The software is being
written in C and Smalltalk. Use of selected, non-
proprietary ACFS components (provided by NASA
Ames) and conformance to ACFS functionality and
communication protocols assures an environment
migration path to the full ACFS for the
AgendaManager.
Functional Requirements
As a first step in designing the AgendaManager, we
developed a formal, functional model of Agenda
Management using IDEF 0, a graphical modelling
methodology Useful for representing and decomposing
complex activities.
As the IDEF0 model itself is too large to include in
this paper, Table 4 presents just the top-level activities
-- functions themselves -- of Agenda Management.
Each activity is represented by an IDEF 0 node
identifier, consisting of the letter 'A' (for Activity) and
a sequence of digits coding subordination relationships
(e.g., A12 is the second sub-activity of activity AI).
The identifier is followed by the name of the activity
(a verb phrase) and a short definition. The activities
marked with an asterisk (*) define the functional
requirements of the AgendaManager: these are
activities that the AgendaManager must perform or
assist the flightcrew in performing.
Architectural Elements
Next, from the IDEF 0 model we generated a data
dictionary consisting of the entities that are the inputs
and outputs (products) of the activities in the model.
These helped us identify necessary components of the
AgendaManager's architecture. Major elements include
System Agents, Actor Agents, Goal Agents, Function
Agents, and Agenda Agents. Each agent will represent
the corresponding entity in the cockpit environment
and be implemented as a software object.
AO* perform flightdeek activities: Perform the
activities of operating a commercial transport
aircraft from its flightdeck. These activities are
performed by human actors (flightcrew) and
machine actors (flightdeck automation) using
flightdeck resources (displays, sensors, controls,
actuators, radios, and other non-'intelligent'
devices).
AI* manage agendas: Manage the actors' agendas.
An agenda consists of a set of goals, a set of
functions to achieve these goals, a set of actor
assignments, and a set of resource allocations.
All* manage individual agendas: Manage the
agenda of each individual actor.
AllI* manage goals: Recognize, infer,
activate, and terminate goals. Recognize
and resolve goal conflicts. Prioritize
active goals.
All2* nmnage functions: Initiate, assess,
prioritize, and terminate functions to
achieve goals.
All3 assign actors to functions: Decide
which actors perform which functions.
All4 allocate resources to ftmctions: Decide
what resources to use for each function.
A12* share agenda information: Share
information about agendas among actors.
A2* perform other functions: Perform specific
functions to achieve mission goal and subgoals.
A21 coordinate actors: Coordinate the activities
of the actors assigned to each function.
A22" assess function: Assess the status of each
function: how well it is being performed and
the likelihood that the goal will be achieved.
A23 maintain situation models: Integrate new
situation information to update the situation
models.
A24 decide/plan: Decide on what actions to
perform immediately or in the future.
A25 act: Transform the decisions into actions.
Table 4. Top-level activities from a functional model
of Agenda Management.
SystemAgents Each system agent's declarative
knowledge will include the past, current, and projected
future state of the corresponding system as well as that
system's status (normal or abnormal). Its procedural
knowledge will include how to obtain and project state
and status information.
Actor Agents As declarative knowledge, each
actor agent will maintain information about the current
state of the corresponding actor, including his/her/its
agenda. Actor agent procedural knowledge will cover
how to obtain state information. Actor agents for
human actors will incorporate intent inferencing as
well as explicit goal communication capabilities.
Goal Agents Declarative knowledge for each goal
agent will include the state of the goal (pending,
active, terminated) and its priority. Its procedural
knowledge will include how to assess goal state and
compute priority.
Function Agents Each function agent will have
declarative knowledge about the state and status of its
function and what system agents to monitor to assess
its function. Function agent procedural knowledge
will include how to assess function state and status.
Agenda Agents An agenda agent will maintain
declarative knowledge about its actor's goals and
functions. It will have procedural knowledge about
how to prioritize goals and functions and how to detect
and resolve goal and function conflicts.
We will implement this architecture (again in
Smalltalk, but this time on a Silicon Graphics Indigo 2
computer), interface it to the part-task simulator, and
evaluate it using flight scenarios under development.
5. Potential Pitfalls
In a separate but related study [8], we and our
colleagues at America West Airlines and Honeywell
have identified over 100 perceived problems with
current cockpit automation. Therefore we are aware
that there are dangers of introducing new technology
into the cockpit. In particular, the AgendaManager has
the potential to increase pilot workload, to induce the
erosion of pilot cognitive skills, and (if often but not
always effective) invite overconfidence. We therefore
have the responsibility to see that these and other
issues are addressed in its development.
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A FUNCTIONAL MODEL OF FLIGHTDECK AGENDA MANAGEMENT
Ken Funk and Bill McCoy
Oregon State University
Corvallis, Oregon USA
Our research represents an effort to understand and facilitate the management of flightdeck activities by
pilots. We developed a preliminary, normative theory of Cockpit Task Management (CTM) and from it
defined an error taxonomy. Based on analyses using this error taxonomy we found CTM errors in 76
(23 per cent) of 324 aircraft accident reports and 231 (49 per cent) of 470 aircraft incident reports.
Concluding that CT_ is a significant factor in flight safety and recognizing the need to broaden as well
as refine the concept, we developed a model of Agenda Management, which includes management not
only of tasks, but goals, functions, actor assignments, and resource allocations as well. Major
components of the functional model include maintaining situation awareness, managing goals
(recognizing, inferring, and prioritizing), managing functions (activating, assessing status, and
prioritizing), assigning actors (pilots and flightdeck automation) to functions, and allocating resources
(such as displays and controls) to functions.
INTRODUCTION
Pilots of modern aircraft must not only perform
multiple, concurrent tasks, they must also manage those
tasks as well as other functions being performed by non-
human actors on the flightdeck. This paper describes our
efforts to understand and facilitate the management of
flightdeck activities, a process we call Agenda Management.
Our studies parallel and to a certain extent follow a line
of research established by Johannsen and Rouse (1979), Hart
(1989), Moray and his colleagues (Moray, Dessouky,
I<.ijowski, & Adapathya, 1991), and Wickens and his
colleagues (Raby and Wickeus, 1994). The concept
common to all of these is that the human operator of a
complex system must perform multiple, concurrent tasks to
control the system and that, as human perceptual and
cognitive resources are limited, must therefore manage those
tasks.
Our own efforts to formalize this notion in the context
of aviation resulted in a preliminary, normative theory of
Cockpit Task Management (Funk, 1991). We defined
Cockpit Task Management (CTM) in terms of the following
activities:
• task initiation: recognizing that a particular goal must
be accomplished and therefore that a task must be
performed to achieve it.
• task monitoring: assessing progress towards achieving
each goal and the level of perforrnance in executing the
task.
• task prioritization: assessing relative task priority in
terms of overall mission and safety importance,
urgency, and momentum or continuity.
• resource allocation: allocating human and machine
resources to the completion of tasks based on task
priority.
• task termination: recognizing that a goal is achieved,
unachievable, or no longer relevant, and ceasing action
on the task.
According to our preliminary theory, these activities
comprise a high-level cognitive process which serves to
determine which low-level activities (i.e., tasks) are being
done at any given time.
To validate the theory, we analyzed aircraft accidents
and incidents (Chou, Madhavan, & Funk, in press). First,
we developed a CTM error taxonomy consisting of the
following error categories:
• task initiation errors: early, late, lacking
• task prioritization errors: incorrect
• task termination errors: early, late, incorrect
We applied this taxonomy to 324 US National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) aircraft accident
reports. These were, to our knowledge, all NTSB reports on
aircraft accidents occurring between 1960 and 1989. First
we reviewed abstracts of the reports and eliminated those
that did not have some clear indication of task management
errors. Of the remainder we examined either the abstracts
or the complete reports themselves in detail, reinterpreting
the NTSB's conclusions in light of CTM theory and the
error taxonomy. We found CTM errors in 76 (23 per cent)
of the reports.
Next we applied the taxonomy to 470 Aviation Safety
Reporting System (ASP, S) aircraft incident reports. These
reports were obtained from ASPS in three separate search
requests: in-flight engine emergencies, controlled flight
toward terrain, and incidents in the terminal phases of flight
(descent, approach, and landing). We reviewed the
narrative sections of these reports, where the reporter
describes the incident in his/her own words. We looked for
explicit references to neglected tasks, misprioritizations, and
delays, again interpreting the conclusions of the reporter in
terms of CTM theory. We found CTM errors in 231 (49 per
cent) of the reports.
From these studies we concluded that CTM is a
significant factor in flight safety and thereby warrants both
further study and efforts to facilitate it to reduce the
likelihood of error.
Events subsequent to these studies, in particular, several
accidents involving highly automated aircraft, have led us to
change our perspective, definitions, and terminology
somewhat.
In particular, if we define an actor as an entity capable
of goal-directed activity, it is very clear that human pilots
are not the only actors in the cockpit or on the flightdeck.
Monitoring and control of the aircraft and its subsystems are
performed by machine actors as well, such as autopilots,
flight management systems, and automated warning and
alerting systems. A common definition of task is a function
performed by a human, where a function is a process
performed to achieve a goal. Therefore, we must
acknowledge that flightcrews in automated aircraft manage
functions, not just tasks.
Furthermore, it is also clear, especially from some
recent accidents, that actors frequently have conflicting
goals, and that these conflicts may lead to conflicting
actions, resulting in unsafe conditions. Goals must be
managed too.
From these insights, we have changed our terminology
and now refer to Agenda Management. An agenda is a set
of goals, functions, actor assignments, and resource
allocations. Managing this agenda is an important process
performed by the flightcrew.
OBJECTIVES
The objectives of our research are to
I. develop and validate a formal model of Agenda
Management.
2. investigate means of facilitating Agenda Management.
METHOD
Since Agenda Management is an activity or a function
itself, we decided that a functional modeling approach
would be appropriate. We performed a functional
decomposition of the process using IDEF0, a graphical
modeling tool. An IDEF0 model consists of block diagrams
representing activities or functions that transform entities,
and the entities those functions act on or are constrained by.
The functions are denoted by verb phrases, the entities are
denoted by noun phrases. IDEFO provides a framework that
helps the modeller identify key transformations that take
place, the objects of the transformations, factors which limit
or guide the transformations, and the mechanisms that
perform the transformations.
Starting at the most general level of flightdeck
activities, we used knowledge derived from the studies
described above to decompose higher level activities to lower
level activities, continuing to a level we felt was necessary
for validation and adequate to help guide the development of
Agenda Management aids.
RESULTS
A portion of our functional model of Agenda
Management is presented below. In particular, major
functions in the process are identified and defined. Each
function is denoted by its IDEF0 identifier, which consists of
the letter 'A' (for Activity) and a sequence of digits showing
hierarchical relationships between functions (AI 1 is the first
subfunction of A1, A112 is the second subfunction of A11,
etc.).
AO perform flightdeck activities - Perform the activities of
operating a commercial Uans_rt aircraft from its
flightdeck. These activities are performed by human actors
(flightcrew) and machine actors (flightdeck automation)
using flightdeck resources (displays, sensors, controls,
actuators, radios, and other non-'intelligent' devices). The
actors may be viewed as a single, integrated cognitive
system.
• AI manage agendas -- Manage the agendas of all
actors.
All manage individual agendas -- Manage the
agenda of each individual actor. Each actor
manages his/her/its own agenda and these agendas
may or may not be consistent.
The following subfunction descriptions (AI 11
through A1144) reflect the activities performed by a
single actor in the management of his/her/its own
agenda.
Alll manage goals - Recognize, infer, activate,
and terminate goals. Prioritize active goals.
This must be coordinated with the goal
management of other actors through shared
agenda information.
Allll infer goals -- Infer the other actors'
goals from actor and other system state
information in the situation models: "What
are the other actors' goals that they have not
explicitly declared?"
All12 assess goals - Determine what goals
should be pursued. Initially, this is just the
mission goal, which is decomposed into
subgoals. But at any given time, this activity
involves adding goals inferred from other
actors and this actor's newly derived goals to
the set of current (pre-existing) goals, then
assessing each to determine if it is pending,
active, or terminated: "What should we be
getting ready to do (pending goals)? What
should we be doing now (active goals)? What
can we forget about (terminated goals)?"
All13 prioritize goals -- Rank the goals
based on the importance and urgency of each
goal. A goal has high importance ff its
achievement is a necessary condition for
achieving the mission goal. It has high
urgency flit must be achieved soon. "What is
most important? What is most urgent? What
is most worthy of our attention fight now?"
All14 identify goal faults - Identify any
goal problems, such as erroneous or
conflicting goals: "Are our goals appropriate
and are we in agreement about them?"
All2 manage functions - Initiate, assess,
prioritize, and terminate functions to achieve
goals. This must be coordinated with the
function management of other actors through
shared agenda information.
All21 activate/deactivate functions - Based
on the active goals, determine what functions
shouldbe performednow: "Are we actually
doing what we shouldbe doing?"
Al122 assess function status - Determine
how well each function is being performed,
with respect to achieving the goal, based on
accuracy, speed, and other factors. As well as
considering the current state of affairs, look
ahead. In addition to using global
information, usespecificstatusinformation
derivedinthe processofperformingeach
function."How wellarcwe doing now? Are
thingslikelytogetbetter,worse,or staythe
same? Is it likely that we will achieve the
goals?"
Al123 prioritize functions - For each
function, determine its priority, based on its
goal's priority, its status, and its momentum
(i.e., functions nearly completed have a
greater momentum than do functions just
begun). "What should we be doing right
now?"
Al124 identify function faults - Identify any
problems with the current functions, such as
inappropriate functions, misprioritized
functions, or discrepancies about functions:
"Are we in agreement about what we should
be doing right now and how well we're
doing?"
All3 assign actors to functions - Decide which
actors are to perform each function. This must
be coordinated with the actor assignments of
other actors through shared agenda information.
All31 identify feasible assignments -
Identify different ways that actors could be
feasibly assigned to perform functions: "How
could we assign actors to functions?"
Al132 evaluate feasible assignments -
Evaluate the different ways actors could be
assigned to functions: "What are the
advantages and disadvantages of particular
actor assignments?
Al133 select assignments - Select the best
actor assignments: "What are the best
assignments?"
Al134 identify assignment faults -- Identify
problems with the assignments, such as
inappropriate assignments and inconsistencies
between actors: "Do we agree on the correct
actor assignments?"
All4 allocate resources to functions - Decide
what resources are to be used to perform each
function. This must be coordinated with the
resource allocations of other actors through
shared agenda information.
All41 identify feasible allocations -
Identify the feasible ways in which resources
could be assigned to functions: "How could
we allocate resources to functions?"
A1142 evaluate feasible allocations - Rate
the different feasible allocations: "What are
the advantages and disadvantages of different
resource allocations?"
Al143 select allocations - Select the best
resour_ allocation: "What are the best
resource allocations?"
Al144 identify allocation faults - Identify
any problems with the resource allocations,
such as inappropriate allocations or
inconsistencies between actors: "Do we agree
on the best resource allocations?"
A12 share agenda information - Communicate
information (overtly and covertly) about agendas
among the actors. It is only through sharing agenda
information that the individual agendas can
approach consistency.
A2 perform other functions - Perform specific
functions (other than managing agendas) to achieve the
mission goal and its subgoals. These can include
monitoring the state of aircraft subsystems, changing
the state of the aircraft and its subsystems by
manipulating conU'ols, making decisions, solving
problems, and planning. The last function yields
additional (derived) goals to accomplish. Performing
such functions involves maintaining situation models.
The following descriptions (A21 through A25) pertain
to the performance of a single function to achieve a
single goal, possibly by multiple actors.
A21 coordinate actors - Coordinate the activities
of the actors assigned to perform the function.
Decide what roles and responsibilities each actor
will have in performing the function.
A22 assess function - Assess the status of this
function: how well it is being performed, what the
future prospects look like, and the likelihood that the
goal will be achieved.
A23 maintain situation models - Update and
exercise each actor's situation model. Each actor has
an internal representation of the current state of the
world and at least human actors can project their
models into the future. Maintenance of these models
is driven by the need for performing this function.
By extension, similar situation model maintenance
activities are conducted in parallel for other
functions.
A231 determine information requirements -
Determine what information is needed to perform
this function.
A232 acquire situation information - Obtain
information from the environment, the aircraft,
and other actors.
A233 integrate situation information -
Integrate new situation information and shared
information from other actors' situation models
into the current situation models.
A2331 update existing situation information
- Use new information about the various
systems to update their state representations
in the situation models.
A2332 add new situation information -
Add other, new information (not just updates
of old information) to the situation models.
A2333 project situation models - Use
possible courses of action to project the
current situation into the future, yielding one
or more possible scenarios.
A2334 identify situation model faults -
Identify problems with the situation models,
such as inaccuracies, omissions, internal
inconsistencies, and lack of agreement
between the models of different actors.
• A234 share situation information -
Communicate about the actors' situation models.
A24 decide/plan - Decide on what actions to
perform immediately to achieve the goal, or plan
what to do in the future. Planning may yield
subgoals derived from this function's goal. These
will be added to the actors' agendas.
A25 act - Perform the actions necessary to achieve
this function's goal. These may include control
manipulations, utterances, etc.
DISCUSSION
The model emphasizes that the flightcrew must manage
goals and functions, assign actors to functions, and allocate
resources to functions. It also underlines the importance of
maintaining situational awareness and communicating
information about individual agendas to identify and resolve
conflicts.
The elements of the full IDEF0 model provide further
details to be used in analyzing accident and incident reports
to identify where Agenda Management may have broken
down. Therefore, it is a potentially useful tool in developing
means of facilitating the process of Agenda Management
through procedures, training, and computational aids.
MODEL VALIDATION
The full IDEFO model reflects our understanding of
Agenda Management, an understanding built largely from
analyzing accident and incident reports and observing
subject behavior in our laboratory. It seems to comport well
with normal flightdeck operations. However, it must be
viewed as a hypothesis, subject to validation.
Our initial approach to validation is a continuation of
our incident report studies. We have prepared a list of
keywords designed to elicit incident reports in which the
reporters describe goals that were not met because a function
was not completed or was interfered with due to
misprioritizations or other Agenda Management errors.
For each such report we find, we are attempting to
determine what goals the flightcrew was pursuing and what
functions were not performed satisfactorily as a result of
failures in Agenda Management. We will attempt to do a
rough quantificatiOn of goals and functions in order to
ascertain the limits to human Agenda Management
performance. We also hope to use the reporters'
descriptions to determine if the structure of our model is
consistent with flightdeck practice. From this analysis we
hope to refine the current model and move towards a model
that may be ultimately validated.
We recognize the limitations inherent in incident report
studies. Therefore, we anticipate that further validation
efforts will involve pilot surveys and simulator experiments.
AIDS TO FACILITATE AGENDA MANAGEMENT
In parallel with our recent modeling efforts, we have
been using knowledge gained in our accident and incident
studies to develop experimental, computational aids to
facilitate Agenda Management (Funk & Kim, 1995). We
have learned that if an aid can accurately ascertain
flightcrew goals and monitor functions being performed to
achieve those goals, it can help improve Agenda
Management performance by bringing to the flightcrew's
attention goal conflicts, unsatisfactory function performance,
and other Agenda Management problems. Our current
efforts center on developing methods for overt and coven
goal communication and mechanisms for assessing function
performance.
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Background: Existing Systems Monitors
The study of airframe systems monitor concepts and aircraft alerting systems was initiated in 1973 when the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) contracted with Boeing to study independent altitude monitors (Parks,
Hayashi, and Fries, 1973). Follow-on studies conducted during 1974 through 1977 investigated operational
philosophies for implementing effective and reliable alerting systems. Study results indicated that there existed a
growing proliferation of alerts on the flightdeck and very little standardization had been used by the airframe
manufacturers in implementing the alerting system elements. Airline pilots began to view alerting systems as a
nuisance rather than a help (Cooper, 1977).
These FAA-funded contracts were performed as joint efforts by the Boeing, Lockheed, and McDonnell Douglas
aircraft companies. Data from the first three studies were combined to develop a human factors guidelines
document (Boucek, Veitengruber, and Smith, 1977). A second series of studies was conducted and the results
combined with the data obtained from the previous investigations to develop the design guidelines contained in an
alerting systems guidelines document (Berson et al., 198 I). During the course of the contract, interest developed
within the FAA in expanding the requirements of the alerting system to monitor overall flight status and facilitate
crew responses to non-normal and emergency situations. The results obtained supported the feasibility of
expanding the functions of the alerting system to perform as a flight status monitor (FSM). The alerting function
of the FSM would serve to alert the flight crew to all non-normal situations for both flight operations as well as
aircraft system operations. However, the functional requirements for the FSM were developed on the assumption
that, by providing guidance and feedback information, crew performance could be improved.
One of the technologies that benefited directly from the guidelines on crew alerting systems was Boeing's
Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) which was first installed on the Boeing 757 and 767
airplanes (Morton, 1983) and has since been recognized as one of the success stories of flight deck automation
(Wiener, 1989). Since then Boeing implemented EICAS on the B747-400 (Boeing, 1989) and the B777-200
(Boeing, 1994). Airbus implemented ECAM on the A320 (Airbus Industrie, 1989) and its family members A319-
A340. McDonnell Douglas' Engine Monitor and Display System (EMADS) can be found on the MD-11 as part of
the Electronic Instrument System (EIS) alerting system (McDonnell Douglas, 1991)
Independent of its specific implementation as either EICAS, ECAM, or EMADS, the centralized alerting and
airplane systems monitoring functions consist of a central crew alerting system and at least one display unit. The
following brief description uses Boeing's original 757/767 implementation as example (Boeing, 1988) (Figure 1).
The system consists of a warning electronics unit; two master warning/caution switch lights; discrete alert
annunciator lights; and caution and advisory message cancel/recall switches. Three levels of alert messages are
presented on the upper display: warnings, cautions, and advisories. The warnings, which are shown in red, are
defined as "an operational or aircraft system condition that requires immediate corrective or compensatory action
by the crew". Examples of warning level alerts are Fire and Takeoff and Landing Configuration.
The cautions, which are shown in amber, were defined as "'an operational or aircraft system condition that
requires immediate crew awareness and future compensatory action". The more serious airframe systems
malfunctions fall into this category, for example, loss of hydraulic system pressure or autothrottle disconnect.
Also shown in amber, but slightly indented, are advisory, messages. They are defined as _'an operational or aircraft
system condition that requires crew awareness and may require corrective action on a time-available basis. For
example, autobrakes or doors. Figure 1 shows examples from the B757 representing the three levels of alerts.
Sinceits introduction on airplanes like the B757/767 the centralized alerting systems have evolved into
comprehensive systems which include (1) the airplane's warning system, (2) the engine indication and crew
alerting system, (3) the ground proximity system, and (4) the traffic collision and avoidance system. The warning
system consists of aural speakers, master warning lights and tactile control column feedback. The aircraft's
warning system usually controls and activates visual/aural and/or tactile alerts for warnings like: (1) fire, (2)
engine failure, (3) cabin altitude, (4) overspeed, (5) stall warning, (6) takeoff and landing confgurafion, (7)
autopilot disconnect, (8) unscheduled stabilizer movement, (9) ground proximity, (10) windshear, (11) traffic alert
and collision avoidance, and (12) crew alertness.
The engine indication and crew alerting system, or electronic centralized aircraft monitor, usually provides (1)
system alerts, (2) communication alerts, (3) memo messages, (4) status messages, and (5) maintenance
information. The system alert message categories have been expanded from the original three categories (warning,
caution, advisory) to include a fourth category, time critical warnings. Time critical warnings are usually
associated with primary flight path control. For example, wind shear, terrain/obstacle avoidance, traffic/collision
avoidance.
The ground proximity warning system (GPWS) provides alerts for potentially hazardous flight conditions
involving imminent impact with the ground. The GPWS also provides an alert for windshear conditions, excessive
angle of bank, and glide slope deviations. However. the GPWS does not provide any warning for flight towards
vertically sheer terrain or a slow descent into terrain while in landing configuration.
The traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) alerts the crew to possible conflicting traffic. The
system interrogates operating transponders in other airplanes, tracks the other airplanes by analyzing the
transponder replies, and predicts the flight paths and positions. Neither advisory, flight path guidance, nor traffic
display is provided for other aircraft that do not have operating transponders. Its operation is independent of
ground-based air traffic control (ATC).
In order to improve the operational use of the alerting systems the individual alerts are tied to a flight phase
logic. This is to avoid distracting alerts especially during high workload phases like takeoff or landing, and also to
inhibit them when they are operationally not necessary or inappropriate. For example, Airbus uses ten distinct
flight phases for its warning/caution inhibit logic (Airbus, 1989). It uses the same logic for the automatic display of
one of the twelve ECAM systems pages on the lower display.
Although the existing centralized indication and alerting systems have generally been very well received by the
operational community, they are limited in at least two important areas: (1) ordering and prioritization of
information within an alert category, and (2) anticipation of flight crew intent on a moment-by-moment logic. In
reference to (1), the key problem is that today's systems during non-normal events display the information in
chronological order. If more than one system is affected the resulting possibly long string of messages has to be
read and interpreted by the flight crew requiring often extensive systems knowledge in order to ensure a correct
diagnosis.
In reference to (2) it could be argued that the Airbus implementation attempts to anticipate the flight crew's
intents by tying the display of specific system pages to a flight phase logic. The problem is that this logic is based
on a limited set of pre-engineered criteria that do not allow for a moment-to-moment assessment of the actual
situation. It is to Airbus' credit that they do allow the pilots to override the automation and select those system
pages manually which may be more suitable for the actual situation.
Limitations of Existing Systems Monitors
Although the existing centralized alerting systems have been very well received by the operational community
they are limited in the extent to which they can tailor the information to the phase of flight and they are not
capable of merging the information in case of multiple failures. Of much greater significance is that little or no
effort is made to consider the flightcrew's intent at any given moment.
Existingcentralized alerting systems are system-centered rather than function-centered. That is, they monitor
aircraft systems and alert or warn the flightcrew if and only if nominal system operating limits are violated,
regardless of what functions the pilots are trying to perform to achieve their immediate goals. They do not alert or
warn if system parameters are not consistent with pilot intent. For example, existing crew alerting systems will
warn the flightcrew of an overspeed condition when the aircraft's maximum operating speed (VMo) is exceeded.
But if ATC directs the flightcrew to maintain 240 knots to maintain spacing with other aircraft, existing systems
will not advise the pilots if that speed is exceeded because it is not sensitive to their immediate goal.
Furthermore, current alerting systems cannot detect when flightdeck automation (e.g., autoflight or the flight
management system) is not configured to operate consistently with flightcrew goals. For example, if the flightcrew
has just received an ATC clearance to descend from 12,000 ft to 9,000 ft, and the flight crew intends to comply
with the clearance by setting the autoflight system mode control panel (MCP) altitude target, no current alerting
system could detect an error and notify the flightcrew if the target altitude value is inadvertently set to 8,000 ft.
The AgendaManager
Building on the successes of existing alerting systems, we are developing and evaluating an experimental,
function-oriented monitoring, alerting, and warning system called the AgendaManger (AMgr), which operates in
a part-task simulator environment. Consistent with existing crew alerting philosophies, the AMgr monitors system
status and alerts and warns the pilot to nominal abnormalities, but the AMgr also monitors systems with respect to
current pilot goals. In our part-task simulator, the pilot declares his/her current goals by verbal utterances, drawn
mostly from acknowledgments to ATC clearances. It also infers the 'goals' of flightdeck automation (e.g., the
target altitude of the autopilot or the active waypoint of the Flight Management System) based on the modes set or
parameters programmed by the pilot. The AMgr then monitors flightcrew and system behavior, assessing whether
or not those goals are being accomplished satisfactorily. When this is not the case, the AMgr informs the pilot.
This functionality serves several purposes. First, it continually monitors activities to determine ff performance is
consistent with declared goals. Second, it helps remind the pilot of important tasks that may have been interrupted
and not resumed. Third, it helps identify conflicts between the goals of the pilot and the goals of the automation.
The remainder of this paper describes, the theory behind the AMgr, the broader motivation for it, its architecture
and operation, and our plans for its evaluation.
Agenda Management
Agenda Management is defined in terms of actors, goals, functions, and resources. An actor is an entity (e.g.,
a human pilot or an autopilot) that can control or change the state of the aircraft and/or its subsystems. A goal is a
representation (mental, electronic, or even mechanical) of an actor's intent to change the state of the aircraft or one
of its subsystems in some significant way, or to maintain or keep the aircraft or one of its subsystems in some state.
A function is an activity performed by an actor to achieve a goal. Functions performed by human actors are called
tasks. Actors use resources to perform functions. Human actor resources include eyes, hands, memory, and
attention; machine actor resources include input and output channels, memory, and processor cycles. Other
machine resources include flight controls, electronic flight instrument system displays, and radios. In general,
several goals might exist at any time, so several functions must be performed concurrently to achieve them. Actors
must be assigned to perform those functions and resources must be allocated to enable them.
An agenda is a set of goals to be achieved and a set of functions to achieve those goals. Agenda Management
(AMgt) is a high-level flightdeck function performed cooperatively by flightdeck actors which involves two sub-
functions. Goal management is the process of recognizing or inferring the goals of all flightdeck actors, canceling
goals that have been achieved or are no longer relevant, identifying and resolving conflicts between goals, and
prioritizing goals consistently with safe and effective aircraft operation. Function management is the process of
initiating functions to achieve goals, assigning actors to perform functions, assessing the status of each function
(whether or not it is being performed satisfactorily and on time), prioritizing those functions based on goal priority
and function status, and allocating resources to be used to perform functions based on function priority. We
consider the scope of AMgt to coincide with a subset of crew resource management (CRM).
At any point in time, AMgt performance is satisfactory if and only if there are no goal conflicts; all goals and
functions are properly prioritized; and either performance of all functions is satisfactory, or ff that is not possible,
actors are actively engaged in bringing the highest priority unsatisfactory functions up to a satisfactory level of
performance. In an earlier study that considered only the management of functions performed by human actors
(that is, task management) we found strong evidence of function prioritization errors in 24 (7%) of 324 aircraft
accidents investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board and 133 (28%) of 470 aircraft incidents
reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System (Chou et al, 1996). One recent and catastrophic instance of
human actor vs. machine actor goal conflicts was the Nagoya, Japan A300 accident (Aircraft Accident
Investigation Commission, 1996). From these preliminary findings we have concluded the failure to perform AMgt
satisfactorily is a significant factor in flight safety. This conclusion led to AMgr development.
AgendaManager Architecture
The AMgr is implemented in Smalltalk, an object-oriented programming language. Major AMgr objects
include System Agents, Actor Agents, Goal Agents, Function Agents, an Agenda Agent, and an Agenda Manager
Interface. Each Agent is a simple knowledge-based object representing the corresponding elements of the cockpit
environment. As a representative of such an element, the Agent's purpose is to maintain timely information about
it and to perform processing that will facilitate AMgt. An Agent's declarative knowledge is represented using
instance variables. Its procedural knowledge is represented using SmaUtalk methods.
System Agents (SAs, e.g., the Aircraft Agent, Engine Agents) help the pilot maintain situational awareness by
representing a system in the simulated environment and making state information about that system available to
other Agents. Actor Agents (AAs, e.g., the Flightcrew Agent, the Autoflight Agent) recognize actors' goals,
implicitly and explicitly, and make them known to the rest of the AMgr. The Flightcrew (or pilot) Agent is
connected to a Verbex speech recognition system which allows the pilot to declare his/her intents explicitly by
short vocal utterances, usually air traffic control (ATC) clearance acknowledgements. Goal Agents (GAs, e.g., a
'descend to 9,000 ft' Goal Agent) represent actors' goals, checking for conflicts with other goals and recognizing
when goals are achieved. Function Agents (FAs, e.g., a 'descend to 9,000 fi' Function Agent) monitor whether the
goals are being achieved in a satisfactory and timely manner. The single Agenda Agent is the executive Agent
which coordinates the activities of all other Agents by maintaining a collection of Goal/Function Agents, initiating
goal conflict assessments, and prioritizing the Agents.
Operation
As the simulator runs, AMgr System Agents maintain a situation model of the simulated aircraft and its
environment. Actor Agents monitor real or simulated actors, detect or infer goals, and create instances of Goal and
Function Agents. Goal Agents look for conflicts with each other and monitor the situation model to see if their
goals are achieved. Function Agents monitor the progress - if any -- made in achieving their associated goals. The
Agenda Agent prioritizes Goal and Function Agents and keeps track of goal conflicts. The AMgr display presents
this Agenda information to the pilot to facilitate AMgt.
AgendaManager Display
For each goal/function, the AMgr displays a short verb phrase, such as 'descend to 9,000 ft', and a brief
function status message, as determined by the Function Agent. If the function is being performed satisfactorily, the
text is shown in white. If not. color coding follows that of EICAS, where possible, and where AMgr functionality
extends beyond that of EICAS (as in monitoring non-system-management related functions) attempts were made to
be consistent with EICAS philosophy. Table 1 compares AMgr messages with corresponding EICAS messages.
Gray cells represent lacking functionality. Black cells represent impossible or don't-care conditions. Though the
AMgr display is still in development, Figure 2 shows the current version with some representative messages.
AgendaManager Evaluation
At the time of writing the AMgr is in final development and evaluation. Line pilots will fly the part-task
simulator with and without the AMgr in a balanced experimental design. We will compare AMgt performance by
measuring the time required to detect and resolve goal conflicts and by recording the proportion of time that all
functions are being performed satisfactorily
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INTRODUCTION
In modern aircraft, the human pilots are no longer the only actors that control the aircraft and its systems.
Machine actors, such as the autopilot and flight management system, also play an active role in control. In fact,
several recent accidents occurred due to goal conflicts between human and machine actors. To prevent the
occurrence of these and other activity management problems, a computational aid called the AgendaManager
(AMgr) is being developed. The AMgr, which operates in a part-task simulator environment, attempts to facilitate
the management of goals the actors are trying to accomplish and the functions being performed to accomplish
them.
To provide accurate knowledge of pilot goals for the AMgr, a Goal Communication Method (GCM) was
developed. The embedded GCM recognizes explicit and/or implicit pilot goals and declares them to the AMgr.
This paper presents the development, architecture, operation, and evaluation of the GCM.
BACKGROUND
On an automated flightdeck the pilot (hereinatier, the human actor) must be able to monitor the automated
systems (hereinafter, the machine actors) as the machine actor must be able to monitor the human actor, also, each
of the two elements must be knowledgeable about the other's intentions or goals. Several intelligent procedural
aids, such as the Pilot's Associate (PA) and the Cockpit Task Management System (CTMS), have been developed
that utilize this cross monitoring function (Rouse et al, 1987; Kim, 1994).
However, it is often difficult for the human actor to efficiently describe the complete set of his/her goals to the
machine actor. That is, the human actor has an explanation problem with respect to the machine actor. In such a
complex, dynamic domain as aviation, the human ability to explain intentions to the intelligent system is highly
constrained by both time and the expressive capabilities of a non-textual interface (Hammer, 1984; Hoshstrasser,
1991). Thus, recognition of pilot goals by machine actors has become an important safety issue as the use of
automation increases in modern aviation systems.
A goal can be defined as the actor's intentions to achieve a desired system state or system behavior. Goal
communication consists of the sharing of goal-directed internal representations between pilots (human actors) and
intelligent subsystems (machine actors) in overt (explicit) or covert (implicit) forms that both actors readily
understand. To design a goal communication framework for the control of an avionics system, it is increasingly
important and useful to distinguish between overt and coven channels of communication.
Overt goal communication allows the human actor to explicitly declare his/her goals to the machine actor via
such standard communication media as the control yoke, buttons and switches, and/or voice commands. In covert
goal communication, the pilot simply performs flight tasks and a model-based intent inferencer infers goals from
the procedural actions (Geddes, 1989; Gerlach et al., 1995; Rubin et al., 1988). By way of caution, it should be
noted that whereas covert goal communication imposes little or no additional workload upon humans within the
cockpit environment, it is subject to error due to the limits of the ability of the machine actor to correctly interpret
pilot actions. And though a chance of misunderstanding poses only a slight risk in experimental laboratory
studies, that slight chance may have serious effects upon aviation safety in more realistic environments. The
objectiveof this research was to integrate overt and covert means of goal communication to combine the reliability
of the former with the low workload demands of the latter.
METHOD
The integrated overt/covert GCM was developed, implemented, and evaluated in a real-time, part-task flight
simulation environment.
Flight Simulator
The simulator consisted of aerodynamic and autoflight models derived from the NASA Langley Advanced
Civil Transport Simulator, primary flight displays derived from the NASA Ames Advanced Concept Flight
Simulator, and subsystem models and synoptic displays developed at Oregon State University. The integrated flight
simulation environment, implemented on Silicon Graphics Indigo-2 UNIX-based workstations, provided a part-
task simulator that modeled a two-engine turbojet transport aircraft.
The Agenda Manager
A flightdeck agenda consists of a prioritized set of goals to be achieved and a prioritized set of functions to
accomplish these goals. It is the responsibility of the flightcrew to see that goals are appropriate and consistent and
that functions are performed to achieve those goals.
The Agenda Manager (AMgr), which operates in the part-task simulator environment, is a computational aid
developed to facilitate management of the flightdeck agenda ( Funk and Braune, 1997). The function of the AMgr
is to recognize actor goals, identify goal conflicts, and monitor the progress of functions being performed to
achieve the goals. The AMgr is implemented in Smalltalk, an object-oriented programming language, and runs on
a Silicon Graphics Indigo-2.
The Goal Communication Method
While it is straightforward for the AMgr to recognize machine actor goals by simply noting modes and target
values, recognizing human pilot goals is not so simple. The Goal Communication Method (GCM) was developed
for this purpose. The GCM is embedded in the AMgr for the recognition, inferencing, updating, and monitoring of
pilot goals. It uses both overt (explicit) and covert (implicit) methods of goal communication.
Oven (Explicit) Goal Communication
To declare pilot goals overtly or explicitly, a verbal modality was employed using an existing Automatic
Speech Recognition system (ASR). Using this method, the subject pilots called out their goals via microphone.
The overt GCM framework consisted of two main pans. The first part recognized the goals using the ASR system
and the second part declared the recognized goals to the AMgr.
While a pilot is performing flightdeck operations, he or she communicates with an Air Traffic Control (ATC)
controller, readily facilitating the detection of pilot goals. Since it is a legal requirement that the pilot read back all
ATC clearances, pilot goals concerning the control of the aircraft's heading speed, and altitude can be recognized
by monitoring these clearance acknowledgments. For example, if ATC issues the clearance "OSU 037, climb to
9000," the pilot acknowledges the clearance with a response "Roger, climb to 9000, OSU 037," and an ASR
system could recognize the pilot's utterance and declare a "climb to 9000 ft" goal to the AMgr.
The ASR system used for this research was a Verbex VAT31 installed in an IBM PC compatible personal
computer. The VAT31 has a 40 MI-Iz Digital Signal Processor (DSP) running under DOS and continuous and
speaker-dependent capabilities. The encoded form of verbally declared goals was sent through an RS232 serial port
to the computer running the AMgr, in which the goals were parsed, declared, and maintained.
Accuracyin therecognitionofpilotgoalsisvery important. Although accuracy depends to a considerable
degree upon current ASR technology, careful human factors engineering of several system design aspects helped to
increase recognition accuracy; for example, vocabulary selection, user and recognizer training, visual and audio
feedback, and means for correcting misrecognition (Cha, 1996).
Covert (Implicit) Goal Communication Method
While pilot goals were recognized via overt means when communicating with the ATC controller, they were
also implicitly inferred from operational and/or other factors, such as the pilot actions of moving the control stick.
The method for inferring goals is called covert goal communication. The covert method was implemented to avoid
the workload associated with overt goal communication. To build dynamic representations of current pilot goals,
the inference logic for the hypothesized current pilot intentions was based upon four components; 1) pilot actions
using sensed input (e.g., throttle, stick, landing gear control), 2) aircraft state information, 3) cockpit procedures,
and 4) overtly declared goals.
With knowledge of the four components, a script was constructed as a data-driven knowledge source. The
script consisted of a Smalltalk representation of loosely ordered sets of pilot actions to carry out a particular goal.
Given the current state of the above component variables and the current flight phase, GCM tried to interpret pilot
actions based upon script-based reasoning processes. If the action could be explained by a script, the
corresponding active goal was recognized and declared by the intent inferencer, which represented a process model
using a blackboard problem-solving method. The knowledge source in this blackboard framework consisted of a
rule-based representation of goals and corresponding scripts for the part-task simulation domain. If the actions
were not predicted by a script, then the GCM asked the pilot to declare his or her goal explicitly using overt GCM.
Evaluation of the GCM
An evaluation of the GCM method of communicating pilot goals was conducted to ensure that the system
correctly recognized the intentions of the human actor. In other words, the evaluation provided a measure of how
well the GCM recognized pilot goals or intentions and how the GCM affected pilot performance. In a laboratory
experiment using human subjects, this evaluation process demonstrated GCM effectiveness in terms of accuracy,
speed, user satisfaction, and workload for the recognition of pilot goals within a simplified version of the AMgr.
Subjects The GCM was evaluated by 10 licensed general aviation pilots. Although most did not have
commercial licenses and were not initially familiar with the electronic displays used in the simulator, all had some
instrument flying knowledge and experience in controlling and monitoring aircraft altitude, speed, and heading.
All of the subjects also had experience communicating with ATC.
Procedures To measure GCM effectiveness in terms of accuracy and workload, subjects were required to fly a
simulated Eugene-to-Portland, Oregon scenario which involved declaring and achieving altitude, heading and
speed goals manually. That is, the autoflight system was not used. Using the same scenario with the same
conditions, one experiment was performed running with the GCM and a second without the GCM. The subject
pilots called out their goals explicitly using a headset microphone. Speech patterns were collected from the
subjects concurrently, as they verbalized their intentions, actions, and problem-solving activities while operating
the flight simulator. While they were flying, subjects were instructed to read back ATC commands immediately
after they were heard. If they failed to declare their goals verbally, they were asked to repeat their goals until the
overt GCM recognized them. The successfully declared goals were displayed on the AMgr displays. The subjects
also removed their goals verbally whenever this was required.
The subject goals were also declared and recognized via covert GCM, which employed the intent-inferencing
mechanism based on aircraft states, subject control actions, and verbally-declared active goal as described above.
Whenever the subjects took actions using thrust levers or control buttons and levers, the GCM inferred, interpreted
and displayed the goals. GCM compared the subject's actions with the current active script. If the actions matched
the script, the actions were explained and the corresponding goal was inferred. Whenever the subjects were aurally
alerted by the GCM that their actions could not be understood, they were asked to remove the ambiguity by taking
a corrective action. If the GCM understood the corrective action, the ambiguity was resolved. If the covert GCM
still failed to recognize the goal correctly, subjects were required to declare the goal verbally using overt GCM.
To measure the subject's perceived workload, the NASA-TLX multi-dimensional subjective measure was used.
To facilitate accurate and objective experimental analysis, the entire flight simulation was videotaped.
RESULTS
Recognition Accuracy
GCM accuracy was measured statistically using confidence-interval estimation to determine accuracy. With
the assumption of normality and a random sample of size 8 for recognition accuracy, we can say with a level of
confidence of 95% that at least 87% of the explicitly declared goals after the first utterance and 99% of the
implicitly declared goals were successfully recognized. Similarly, at least 93% recognition accuracy was obtained
by the integrated method of covert and overt GCM. When overtly declared goals were not recognized after the first
utterance, recognition accuracy after the second (corrective) utterance was 99%.
Comparison of workload
The objective of measuring workload was to know if any additional workload was imposed on subjects using
GCM. It was assumed that the differences of n = 8 paired observations were normally and independently
distributed random variables with mean A'_ and variance tYD2. The null hypothesis was that there was no additional
workload when subjects used GCM. From the results shown in Table 1, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Therefore, it may be safely concluded that no extra workload was imposed by GCM.
Table 1 Workload comparison
legs takeoff& climb cruise & descend descend & approach
w  GC.M w/o CrC.M difference w  GCM w/o C_rCM difference w  GC_.M w/o _ difference
mean 3.8 3.0 0.9 1.3 1.2 0.1 4.8 4.4 0.4
variance 1.36 1.34 1.80 0.59 0.54 0.44 2.85 5.67 3.20
to 1.791 0.588 0.633
to5,7 1.895 1.895 1.895
Comparison of pilot flight control performance
The objective of measuring pilot performance in controlling flight was to know whether GCM interfered with
pilot performance in controlling flight. Table 2 compares the data collected with and without GCM as a
percentage of satisfactory performance. With the assumption of normality, the null hypothesis that there was no
difference between performance in controlling speed, altitude, and heading with or without the GCM could not be
rejected. Therefore, it may be concluded that the use of GCM did not significantly affect pilot flight control
performance during the simulation.
Table 2 Flight control performance comparison chart
speed goal altitude goal heading goal
w/GCM w/o C-CM diff w/GCM w/o GCM diff w/C-CM w/o GCM cliff
mean 68% 64% 4% 43% 43% 0% 51% 48% 3%
variance 0% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 2% 1% 1%
to 1.287 0.045 1.219
t,o25,7 2.365 2.365 2.365
DISCUSSION
Overall, the laboratory experiments conducted for the present study demonstrated the ability of the GCM to
successfully recognize overt and coven goals. Specifically, the overt and coven integrated method achieved at least
93% accuracy while the overt GCM alone obtained at least 87% accuracy after the first utterance and 99%
accuracy after the second (corrective) utterance. It was also indicated that the GCM neither imposed extra
workload on the subjects, nor affected subjects' flight control performance.
However, this is not to say that the GCM would not face potential limitations when applied to real flight
systems. The potential problems and limitations of the GCM used for this study are related to limitations in ASR
technology and in intent inferencing.
Limitations To ASR Technology
Over the past two decades advances in ASR technology have contributed to a technology that has potential for
aviation domains exhibiting mentally, physically and psychologically stressful environments. But, as seen from the
experimental results, approximately 9% of GCM overt goal declarations were incorrect after the first utterance.
This level of accuracy is not sufficient for real world applications. Nevertheless, several investigations have
successfully used ASR systems for the recognition of overfly declared pilots goals in real cockpit environments,
leading to the overall conclusion that most overt goal recognition errors could be removed by repeating
declarations of unrecognized goals or by the application of updated ASR technologies (Williamson, 1996; Gerlach
et al., 1995). In fact, the experimental results from the present study demonstrated that the second utterances for
failed goal recognition achieved close to 100% accuracy. Thus, if we accept the costs of second trials or of the
inclusion of advanced technologies, the GCM can be considered to be an accurate means of goal communication.
Limitations to Intent Inferencing
To resolve the workload associated with overt communications, the present study employed a model-based
inferencer to infer pilot goals. Although the experimental results showed almost perfect recognition accuracy of the
coven goals, the accuracy of the coven GCM probably resulted in large part from the fact that the inferencing was
done in a highly simplified environment and was based on limited actions, simple scripts and rules, and simple
scenarios. The effective use of intent inferencing in a more realistic environment would require a more robust
intent inferencing mechanism such as the Georgia Tech crew-activity tracking system (GT-CATS) (Callantine and
Mitchell, 1994). To infer the flightcrew goals, GT-CATS decomposes operator function into automatic control
modes, which can be used to perform the functions. Each mode in turn decomposes into the tasks, subtasks, and
actions required to use it, depending on the situation.
Conclusion
Insofar as it was demonstrated that the GCM developed for the present study has the capacity to recognize
pilot goals with a high degree of accuracy and with little or no increase in workload, we conclude that GCM is
suitable for use in the AgendaManager, at least for development purposes. To the extent that the use of the AMgr
is restricted, for the time being at least, to laboratory or training environments, GCM should be a suitable 'front
end' to correctly recognize pilot goals. Future implementations of the AMgr in real aircraft will require better
automatic speech recognition systems and more robust intent irfferencing mechanisms.
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Communicating Pilot Goals to an Intelligent Cockpit Aiding System
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INTRODUCTION
In modem aircraft, the human pilots are no longer the only actors that control the aircraft and its systems.
Machines, such as the autopilot and flight management system, also play an active role in control. In fact, several
recent accidents occurred due to goal conflicts between human and machines. To facilitate the coordination of
these actors, a computational aid called the AgendaManager (AMgr) is being developed. The AMgr, which
operates in a part-task simulator environment, attempts to facilitate the management of goals the actors are trying
to accomplish and the functions being performed to accomplish them. To provide accurate knowledge of pilot goals
for the AMgr, a goal communication method (GCM) was developed. The embedded GCM recognizes explicit
and/or implicit pilot goals and declares them to the AMgr. This paper presents the development, architecture,
operation, and evaluation of the GCM.
BACKGROUND
The AgendaManager
A goal is a desired aircratt or aircralt subsystem state or behavior. For example, 'climb to 9000 feet' or
'restore fuel pressure to right engine' are goals. A function is an activity performed to achieve a goal. Goals are
declared and functions are performed by actors. Human actors are pilots. Machines include autoflight and flight
management systems. An agenda is a set of goals and functions. Agenda Management (AMgt) is a high level
fimction performed by the flightcrew that involves
1. assessing the goals of all actors, removing those that are achieved, inappropriate, or inconsistent;
2. assessing the functions being performed to achieve those goals to see that satisfactory progress is
being made towards achieving the goals;
3. prioritizing the functions, based on the importance and urgency of the goals and the status of the
functions; and
4. allocating actor attention to the functions in order of assessed priority.
Ideally, AMgt is performed continuously by the flightcrew, so that all appropriate goals are achieved and that
the higher priority functions are performed before the lower priority ones.
In fact, that does not always happen. In analyses of 324 National Transportation Safety Board aircraft accident
reports and 450 Aviation Safety Reporting System aircraft incident reports, we found that improper AMgt
contributed to 76 (23 %) aircraft accidents and 231 (49 %) aircraft incidents (Chou et al, 1996).
As one possible approach to dealing with this problem, we are developing an experimental, computational aid
to facilitate AMgt called the Agenda_Manager (AMgr). The AMgr operates in a part-task simulator environment,
which is described below. It is an agent-based system made up of a collection of software modules called agents.
Each agent represents some entity in the simulated flightdeck environment.
System agents represent aircraft systems, such as engines and the fuel system. Each system agent maintains
current state information on its system, such as engine speed or fuel pressure, and detects system faults, such as
engine fires or fuel pressure drops.
Goal agents represent actor goals. Each goal agent is capable of recognizing the conditions necessary for goal
m2
achievement. Additionally, goal agents recognize goal conflicts, such as would occur when the pilot's goal was to
climb to 9,000 fl but the autoflight system's target altitude was inadvertently set to 8,000 ft.
Function agents represent the functions being performed to achieve the goals. A function agent records the
status of the function and assesses function performance. For example, a 'climb to 9,000 fl' function agent knows
that its fimction has a high priority (because altitude control is critical to flight safety) and can determine ff the
aircraft's altitude is changing towards the 9,000 fl target value.
Actor agents are a special kind of system agent representing actors. The autoflight agent keeps track of the
autoflight system's goals by noting its modes and target values and iustantiating goal agents. The flightcrew agent
keeps track of the simulator pilot's goals in a manner described below.
The AMgr interface consists of a display that informs the pilot of goal conflicts and the status of each function,
thereby facilitating AMgt As the pilot "flies" the simulator, either manually or by using the autoflight system,
system agents monitor aircraft and aircraft system state, and when faults are detected, instanliate goal agents for
goals to correct them. Actor agents recognize actor goals to control the aircraft and instantiate corresponding goal
agents. Goal agents check for goal conflicts and inform the pilot of any via the AMgr display. Function agents
continually monitor the progress of functions to achieve the goals and inform the pilot if any are not being
performed satisfactorily. The pilot is thus informed of the state of the simulated flightdeck environment and AMgt
is facilitated.
Goal Communication
But this process can work only if the pilot can make his/her goals known to the AMgr. This is a special case of
the human-machine goal comraunication problem. In fact, it is often difficult for the human actor to efficiently
describe the complete set of his/her goals to a machine such as the AMgr. That is, the human actor has an
explanation problem with respect to the machine. In such a complex, dynamic domain as aviation, human ability
to explain intentions to the intelligent system is highly constrained by both time and the expressive capabilities of a
non-textual interface (Hammer, 1984; Hoshstrasser, 1991). Thus, recognition of pilot goals by machines has
become an important safety issue as the use of automation increases in modern aviation systems.
Goal communication consists of the sharing of goal representations between human actors and intelligent
machines in overt (explicit) or covert (implicit) forms that both the human and the machine readily understand.
To design a goal communication framework for the control of an avionics system, it is increasingly important and
useful to distinguish between overt and covert channels of communication.
Overt Goal Communication
Overt goal communication is an activity which allows the human actor to explicitly declare goals to a
machine, such as the AMgr. One set of general alternatives consists of such standard communication media as the
control yoke, buttons and switches, a keyboard, a touch panel, a mouse, and/or voice commands. For example, the
human actor communicates a goal to the autopilot (A/P) subsystem via the mode control panel (MCP), which con-
sists of several interrelated knobs and buttons. If the human actor wants to engage the autopilot, then the goal is
stated explicitly by simply activating the A/P switch on the MCP. Or, the human actor may tell the flight
management system (FMS) by keystrokes on the Control Display Unit (CDU) to follow a certain flight path, and
the FMS responds by informing the human actor of the estimated time of arrival and rate of fuel consumption.
Finding these estimates acceptable, the human actor explicitly instructs the FMS to implement the plan via the
CDU. Standard input devices such as buttons and keyboard, used as overt communication media, often fail to
recognize pilot goals directly and accurately because human pilots are fallible in their operation of buttons and
switches, and because the pilots may experience additional cognitive loading to perform the operations.
All activities that declare a pilot's goals explicitly are considered to be explicit goal communications, even
should such communications imply covert communications. For example, if the pilot should push the flight level
change switch on the MCP to the on position, the activity itself is explicit goal communication, since the pilot has
explicitlydeclaredthegoal of changing the altitude. At the same time, such a goal would automatically imply the
holding of current heading and to trigger vertical speed modes. Goals for the heading hold and vertical speed
modes will be implicitly declared from the implicit goal communication method.
Although the technology for speech interaction between humans and machines is by no means perfect,
Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) technology has received increased attention as an input means for direct and
accurate overt goal communication. And despite the fact that current ASR technology has focused heavily on
telecommunication applications such as voice activated telephone services, ASR is considered to be a promising
method to declare pilot goals in a wide range of airborne environments, from helicopters and military jets
(Mounfford and North, 1980; Reed, 1985; WiUiamson et al., 1996) to civil aircraft (Start, 1993). The application
domain of flying an airplane is recognized as being potentially challenging to the use of ASR, since it exhibits
some attributes that characterize adverse environments for ASR, such as high noise levels, high acceleration forces,
and extreme levels of workload and stress (Williamson et al., 1996; Baber and Noyes, 1996). Nevertheless, ASR
has been increasingly explored in the aviation domain not only because of its potential to reduce pilot workload;
ASR permits "eyes-and hands-free" interaction with flight control systems and allows pilots to maintain head-up
flight with "hands on throttle and stick" control. The potential exists also because of the fact that pilots are
consistently communicating their goals verbally with air-traffic controllers and other flightcrew members, and
because ASR technology is advancing rapidly.
Coven Goal Communication
The control actions of the pilot as he/she controls the aircraft by means of yoke, rudder pedals, throttles, and
other controls implicitly carry within them information about the pilot's goals. Such goal information is available
to and could be interpreted by an intelligent machine, such as the AMgr. This form of goal communication is
coven in the sense that the human need not be conscions of the information transformation process.
There are two primary reasons for trying to use covert goal communication. The first reason is to avoid the
workload associated with overt communication. For example, ff the machine could be enabled to covertly assess
the human actor's intentions, then the human would not be distracted from other activities for the purpose of
supplying this information. The second motive for the use of covert goal communication is based upon the
possibility that, at certain times or in certain situations, it will not be possible to communicate goals overtly due to
the fact that hands and voice are fully occupied with other, safety critical activities.
To communicate covertly or implicitly with an intelligent aid in a highly dynamic system, the human actor simply
performs procedural steps and a model_sed intent inferencer infers goals from the procedural actions (Gerlach et
al., 1995; Onken and Prevot, 1994; Geddes, 1985, 1989; Mitchell, 1987; Rubin et al., 1988). In other words,
covert communication models are embedded within the intent inferencer and compared with human actions in an
attempt to infer what the human's goals are.
Integration of Overt and Covert Goal Communication
Whereas covert goal communication imposes little or no additional workload upon the human actor, control
actions can be ambiguous with respect to pilot intent, and misunderstanding of pilot goals by an intent inferencer is
a real possibility. And though a misunderstanding poses little risk in experimental laboratory studies, it could be
catastrophic in more realistic environments. On the other hand, overt goal communication by voice or manual
means imposes additional workload and may interfere with safety critical activities.
A possible solution to this dilemma is the integration of overt and covert goal communication. Hopefully, such
an integrated method would offer the reliability of overt communication and the low workload requirements of
covert communication.
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RESgARCH OBJECTIVES
The principal goal of this research was to develop an integrated method of overt and covert (explicit and
implicit) goal communication, to be embedded within the AMgr to facilitate AMgt performance. The objectives of
this experimental investigation were to
°
2.
develop a goal communication method (GCM) to recognize pilot goals based upon the integration of implicit
(covert) as well as explicit (overt) modes of communication and
evaluate the methodology in the context of a real-time flight simulation environment with respect to
• GCM accuracy,
• GCM speed,
• user satisfaction with GCM,
• workload imposed by GCM, and
• pilot flight control performance while using GCM.
METHOD
The integrated overt/covert GCM was developed, implemented, and evaluated in a real-time, part-task flight
simulation environment.
Flight Simulator
The simulator consisted of aerodynamic and autoflight models derived from the NASA Langley Advanced
Civil Transport Simulator, prima_ flight displays derived from the NASA Ames Advanced Concept Flight
Simulator, and subsystem models and synoptic displays developed at Oregon State University. The integrated flight
simulation environment, implemented on Silicon Graphics Indigo-2 UNIX-based workstations, provided a part-
task simulator that modeled a two-engine ttubojet transport aircraft.
The Goal Communication Method
While it is straightforward for the AMgr to recognize machine goals by simply noting modes and target
values, recognizing human pilot goals is not so simple. The Goal Communication Method (GCM) was developed
for this purpose. The GCM is embedded in the AMgr for the recognition, inferencing, updating, and monitoring of
pilot goals. It uses both overt (explicit) and covert (implicit) methods of goal communication.
Overt (Explicit) Goal Communication
To declare pilot goals overtly or explicitly, the verbal modality was employed using a commercial automatic
speech recognition system (ASR). Using the ASR, the subject pilots called out their goals via microphone. The
overt GCM framework consisted of two main parts. One was to recognize the goals from the ASR system process
and the second was to declare the recognized goals to the AMgr.
While a pilot is performing flightdeck operations, he/she communicates with an air traffic control (ATC)
controller, readily facilitating the detection of his/her goals. Since it is a legal requirement that the pilot read back
ATC clearances, pilot goals concerning the control of the aircraft's heading speed, and altitude can be recognized
by monitoring these clearance acknowledgments. For example, if ATC issues the clearance "OSU 037, climb to
9000," the pilot acknowledges the clearance with a response "Roger, climb to 9000, OSU 037," and an ASR
system could recognize the pilot's utterance and declare a "climb to 9000 tt" goal to the AMgr.
The ASR system used for this research was a Verbex VAT31 installed in an IBM PC compatible personal
computer. The VAT31 has a 40 MHz Digital Signal Processor (DSP) running under DOS and continuous and
speaker-dependent capabilities. The Verbex grammar definition file defined vocabulary and grammar for a subset
of pilot-to-ATC controller communication. Subject voice pattern files was created using the voice recognizer
training process. As utterances were made by the subjeccts, the encoded form of verbally declared goals was sent
through an RS232 serial port to the computer running the AMgr, in which the goals were parsed, declared, and
stored.
Accuracy in the recognition of pilot goals is very important. Although accuracy depends to a considerable
degree upon current ASR technology, careful human factors engineering of several system design aspects helped to
increase recognition accuracy; for example, vocabulary selection, user and recognizer training, and visual and
audio feedback (Cha, 1996).
Covert (Implicit)Goal Communication Method
While pilot goals were recognized via overt means when communicating with the ATC controller, they were
also implicitly inferred from operational and/or other factors, such as the pilot actions of moving the control stick.
This method for recognizing goals is a form of covert goal communication. The covert method was implemented
to avoid the workload associated with overt goal communication. To build dynamic representations of current pilot
goals, the inference logic for the hypothesized current pilot intentions was based upon four components;
1. pilot actions using sensed input (e.g., throttle, stick, landing gear control),
2. aircraft state information,
3. flightdeck procedures, and
4. overfly declared goals.
With knowledge of the four components, for each goal a script was constructed as a data-driven knowledge
source. The script consisted of a representation of a loosely ordered set of pilot actions to carry out the goal (see
Table 1).
Table 1 An Example Of Active Speed Script
speedSc,W
overtTargetSpeed isNil i/False: [inferredTargetSpeed := overtTargetSpeedJ.
action = #thrustLeverUp
ill"rue:
[phase = #beforeTakeoff
ifl)qLle"
[inferredSpeedGoal := #maintainTakeoffSpeed.
inferredTargetSpeed : = rotateSpeed.J
i/False: [inferredSpeed : = #maintainSpeedJ.
inferredTargetSpeed = nil i /True: [inferredSpeedGoal : = # increaseSpeedJ
"self].
inferredSpeedGoal : = #notUnderstoodPilotAction.
Ase_f
Given the current state of the above component variables and flight phases, GCM tried to interpret pilot
actions based upon script-based reasoning processes (see Figure 1). If the action could be explained by an active
script, the corresponding active goal was recognized and declared by the intent inferencer, which represented a
process model using a blackboard problem-solving method. The knowledge source in this blackboard framework
consisted of a rule-based representation of goals and corresponding scripts for the pan-task simulation domain. If
the actions were not predicted by the active script, then the GCM would ask the pilot to ignore the covert GCM and
declare his or her goal explicitly using overt GCM.
declare
goal
Figure 1 Covert GCM Process
Evaluation of the GCM
An evaluation of the C-CM was conducted to ensure that the system correctly recognized the intentions of the
human actor. In other words, the evaluation provided a measure of how well the GCM recognized pilot goals or
intentions and how the GCM affected pilot performance. In a laboratory experiment using human subjects, this
evaluation process demonstrated GCM effectiveness in terms of accuracy, speed, user satisfaction, and workload
for the recognition of pilot goals within a simplified version of the AMgr.
Subjects The GCM was evaluated by 10 licensed general aviation pilots. Although most did not have commercial
licenses and were not initially familiar with the electronic displays used in the simulator, all had some instrument
flying knowledge and experience in controlling and monitoring aircraft altitude, speed, and heading. All of the
subjects also had experience in air traffic control (ATC) communication.
Procedures To measure GCM effectiveness in terms of accuracy and workload, subjects were required to fly a
simulated Eugene-to-Portland, Oregon scenario which involved declaring goals and performing tasks to control
altitude, heading and speed manually. The autoflight system was not used. Using the same scenario with the same
conditions, one experiment was performed running with the GCM and a second without the GCI_ The subject
pilots called out their goals explicitly using a headset microphone. Speech patterns were collected from the
subjects concurrently, as they verbalized their intentions, actions, and problem-solving activities while operating
the flight simulator. While they were flying, subjects were supposed to read hack ATC commands immediately
after they were heard. If they failed to declare their goals verbally, they were asked to gpeat their goals until the
overt GCM recognized them. The successfully declared goals were displayed on the AMgr displays. The subjects
also removed their goals verbally whenever this was required.
The subject goals were also declared and recognized via covert GCM, which employed the intent-inferencing
mechanism based on aircraft states, subject control actions, and verhally-declared active goal as described above.
Whenever the subjects took actions using thrust levers or control buttons and levers, the GCM inferred, interpreted
and displayed the goals. GCM compared the subject's actions with the current active script_ If the actions matched
the script, the actions were explained and the corresponding goal was inferred. Whenever the subjects were aurally
alerted by the GCM that their actions could not be understood, they were asked to remove the ambiguity by taking
a corrective action. If the GCM understood the corrective action, the ambiguity was resolved. If the covert GCM
still failed to recognize the goal correctly, subjects were required to declare the goal verbally using overt GCM.
7To measure the subject's perceived workload, the NASA-TLX (task load index) multi-dimensional subjective
measure was used (Hart & Staveland, 1988). To facilitate accurate and objective experimental analysis, the entire
flight simulation was videotaped.
RESULTS
Recognition Accuracy
GCM accuracy was measured statistically using confidence-interval estimation to determine accuracy. With
the assumption of normality and a random sample of size 8 for recognition accuracy, we can say with a level of
confidence of 95% that at least 87% of the explicitly declared goals after the first utterance, and 99% of the
implicitly declared goals were successfully recognized. Similarly, at least 93% recognition accuracy was obtained
by the integrated method of covert and overt GCM. When overtly declared goals were not recognized after the first
utterance, recognition accuracy after the second (corrective) utterance was 99°/0.
Comparison of workload
The objective of measuring workload was to know ff any additional workload was imposed on subjects using
GC/vl. It was assumed that the differences of n = 8 paired observations were normally and independently
distributed random variables with mean Pt_ and variance cb 2. The null hypothesis was that there was no additional
workload when subjects used GCM. From the results shown in Table 2, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Therefore, it may be safely concluded that no extra workload was imposed by GCM.
Table 2 Workload comparison
_0-_ [..................t_ _n,,_ [ c_i_ _ ,_,,,d ! d,.,c_.,a,_.,,.e.e._oa¢h
• • " ........... .'_ ............ . ............................. _" .................... I ................. t................ ".. ..................
i w/_ [ w/o _ i difference i w/G O,t i w/O GCAf [ difference i w/_ [ w/o_ [ difference
mean i 3.8 i 3.0 i 0.9 i 1.3 i 1.2 i 0.1 [ 4.8 i 4.4 _ 0.4
......... -.-............. ..--................. -e..................... .:.................... .:............... _.............. 4.................... "................... .:..................... 4 ..............
variance _ 1.36 i 1.34 i 1.80 _ 0.59 i 0.54 _ 0.44 i 2.85 i 5.67 i 3.20
......................... ".". ................... -."................. i.................. -.'................ _............... _ ................... :.................... :..................... ._................
to i i .: 1.791 _ • i 0588 i i i 0633
..................... q................... * ............... | ................... i.................. _. ................. 4....... "-:............ i.................... i.................. ._...... "..........
to5,7 i i 1.895 • i } 1.895 i i i 1.895
Comparison of pilot flight control performance
The objective of measuring pilot performance in controlling flight was to know whether GCM interfered with pilot
performance in controlling flight. Table 3 compares the data collected with and without GCM as a percentage of
satisfactory performance. With the assumption of normality, the null hypothesis that there was no differeace
between performance in controlling speed, altitude, and heading with or without the GCM could not be rejected.
Therefore, it may be concluded that the use of GCM did not significantly affect pilot flight control performance
during the simulation.
Table 3 Flight control performance comparison chart
speed goal altitude goal heading goal
"'"_7"66.'i;.i... ...."g,'/o"_ _i.........._ ........";,7"_'fi ......7//o"6£5fi..........._ ..........._'/'_ _"........._,io"_;6"_........._ ......
mean 68% 64% 4% 43% 43% 0% 51% 48% 3%
......van....a_.._.......... 0% ...... 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 2% i 1% 1%
to 1.287
................................................... i 0.045 i 1.219
to25,7 , , , 2.365 , " 2.365 -:
• , i , _ , 2.365
8DISCUSSION
Overall, the laboratory experiments conducted for the present study demonstrated the ability of the GCM to
successfully recognize overt and cove, goals. Specifically, the overt and covert integrated method achieved at least
93% accuracy while the overt GCM alone obtained at least 87% accuracy after the first utterance and 99%
accuracy after the second (corrective) utterance. It was also indicated that the GCM neither imposed extra
workload on the subjects, nor affected subjects' flight control performance.
However, this is not to say that the GCM would not face potential limitations when applied to real flight
systems. The potential problems and limitations of the GCM used for this study are related to limitations in ASR
technology and in intent inferencing.
Limitations To ASR Technology
Over the past two decades advances in ASR technology have contributed to a technology that has potential for
aviation domains exhibiting mentally, physically and psychologically stressful environments. But, as seen from the
experimental results, approximately 9% of GCM overt goal declarations were incorrect after the first utterance.
This level of accuracy is not sufficient for real world applications. Nevertheless, several investigations have
successfully used ASR systems for the recognition of overtly declared pilots goals in real cockpit environments,
leading to the overall conclusion that most overt goal recognition errors could be removed by repeating
declarations of muecognized goals or by the application of updated ASR technologies (Williamson, 1996; Gerlach
et al., 1995). In fact, the experimental results from the present study demonstrated that the second utterances for
failed goal recognition achieved close to 100% accuracy. Thus, if we accept the costs of second trials or of the
inclusion of advanced technologies, the GCM can be considered to be an accurate means of goal communication.
Limitations to Intent Inferencing
To resolve the workload associated with overt communications, the present study employed a model-based
inferencer to infer pilot goals. Although the experimental results showed almost perfect recognition accuracy of the
covert goals, the accuracy of the covert GCM probably resulted in large part from the fact that the inferencing was
done in a highly simplified environment and was based on limited actions, simple scripts and rules, and simple
scenarios. The effective use of intent inferencing in a more realistic environment would require a more robust
intent inferencing mechanism such as the Georgia Tech crew-activity tracking system (GT-CATS) (CaUantine and
Mitchell, 1994). To infer the flightcrew goals, GT-CATS decomposes operator function into automatic control
modes, which can be used to perform the functions. Each mode in turn decomposes into the tasks, subtasks, and
actions required to use it, depending on the situation.
Conclusion
Insofar as it was demonstrated that the GCM developed for the present study has the capacity to recognize
pilot goals with a high degree of accuracy and with little or no increase in workload, we conclude that GCM is
suitable for use in the AgendaManager, at least for development purposes. To the extent that the use of the AMgr
is restricted, for the time being at least, to laboratory or training environments, GCM should be a suitable 'front
end' to correctly recognize pilot goals. Future implementations of the AMgr in real aircral_ will require better
automatic speech recognition systems and more robust intent inferencing mechanisms.
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Commercial air transportation has an admirable safety
record, yet each year hundreds of lives and hundreds of
millions of dollars worth of property are lost in air
crashes in the United States alone. About two-thirds of
these aircraft accidents are caused, in part, by pilot error.
Many of these errors are errors in performing flightdeck
(or cockpit) functions, others are errors in managing
flightdeck goals and the functions to achieve those goals.
This paper describes the development and evaluation of
a prototype computational aid to facilitate the
management of flightdeck goals and functions.
Background: Agenda Management
The concept of Agenda Management is an extension of a
theory of Cockpit Task Management proposed by Funk
[5]. Informally speaking, an agenda is a list of things to
be done. So, managing a flightdeck agenda can be
described informally as managing the intentions of the
flightcrew and flightdeck automation and managing their
activities to fulfiU those intentions.
More formally, Agenda Management is described in
terms of actors, goals, functions, and resources. An actor
is an entity that does something in that it can control or
change the state of the aircraft and/or its subsystems.
Pilots are human actors; machine actors include
autoflight and flight management systems. A goal is a
representation (mental, electronic, or even mechanical)
of an actor's intent to change the state of the aircraft or
one of its subsystems in some significant way, or to
maintain or keep the aircraft or one of its subsystems in
some state. For example, a pilot might have a goal to
descend to an altitude of 9,000 fi, a goal to maintain the
current heading of 270 °, and a goal to crossfeed fuel to
correct a fuel system imbalance. If configured properly,
the autoflight system in this example would also have a
goal to descend to 9,000 ft and a goal to hold 270 °.
Goals come about as a result of planning and decision
making in the case of human actors, and computation or
human input, in the case of machine actors.
A function is an activity performed by an actor to
achieve a goal. That activity may directly achieve the
goal or it may produce sub-goals which, when achieved
by performing sub-functions, satisfy the conditions of
the original goal. Actors use resources to perform
functions. Human actor resources include eyes, hands,
memory, and attention; machine actor resources include
input and output channels, memory, and processor
cycles. Other machine resources include flight controls,
electronic flight insmmlent system displays, and radios.
In general, several goals might exist at any time, so
several functions most be performed concurrently to
achieve them. Actors must be assigned to perform those
functions and resources must be allocated to enable
them. An agenda then is a set of goals to be achieved
and a set of functions to achieve those goals.
Agenda Management (AMgt) is a high-level flightdeck
function performed cooperatively by flightdeck actors
which involves two sub-functions:
1. Goal management is the process of
I. 1. recognizing or inferring the goals of all
flightdeck actors;
1.2. canceling goals that have been achieved or are
no longer relevant;
1.3. identifying and resolving conflicts between
goals; and
1.4. prioritizing goals consistently with safe and
effective aircraft operation.
2. Function management is the process of
2.1. initiating functions to achieve goals;
2.2. assigning actors to perform functions;
2.3. assessing the status of each function (whether
or not it is being performed satisfactorily and
on time);
2.4. prioritizing those functions based on goal
priority and function status; and
2.5. allocating resources to be used to perform
functions based on function priority.
At any point in time, AMgt performance is satisfactory
if and only if:
1. there are no goal conflicts;
2. all goals and functions are properly prioritized; and
3. either
3.1. performance of aU functions is satisfactory, or
3.2. if that is not possible, actors are actively
engaged in bringing the highest priority
unsatisfactory functions up to a satisfactory
level of performance.
In an earlier study that considered only the management
of functions performed by human actors (that is, task
management [4]) we found strong evidence of function
prioritization errors in 24 (7%) of 324 aircraft accidents
investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board
and 133 (28%) of 470 aircral_ incidents reported to the
Aviation Safety Reporting System. Two recent aircraR
accidents illustrate human actor vs. machine actor goal
conflicts. In 1994 in a China Airlines Airbus A300 on
approach to Nagoya, Japan, the flightcrew inadvertently
initiated an autoflight system go-around maneuver while
trying to continue the landing [2]. The goal conflict
between the flightcrew and the autoflight system caused
an out-of-trim condition that resulted in a stall and crash
which killed 264 persons. In an American Airlines
Boeing 757 on approach to Cali, Columbia in 1995, the
flightcrew accepted an air traffic control clearance direct
to a designated navigational fix [ I ]. They inadvertently
configured the aircraft's flight management system to fly
the airplane to a different fix. This goal conflict was not
detected in time to prevent the aircraft from crashing into
mountainous terrain, killing 159 persons.
OMectives
From these preliminary findings we have concluded that
AMgt - and specifically the failure to perform AMgt
satisfactorily --. is a significant factor in flight safety. The
objectives of our research were to develop and evaluate
an experimental computational aid to facilitate AMgt.
We call this aid the AgendaManager.
The AgendaManager
Simulator Environment
Our part-task simulator models a generic, twin engine
transport aircra_. It is built from components developed
at the NASA Langley and NASA Ames Research centers
and in our own lab. It runs on one or two Silicon
Graphics Indigo 2 computers and provides a simplified
aerodynamic model (Langley), autoflight system
(Langley), Flight Management System (Langley),
primary flight displays (Ames), Mode Control Panel
(Ames), and system models and system synoptic displays
(OSL0. The software is written in C, FORTRAN, and
Smalltalk (VisualWorks 2.5).
Analysis and Design
As a first step in designing the AgendaManager, we
developed a formal, functional model of Agenda
Management using IDEF0, a graphical modeling
methodology useful for representing and decomposing
complex activities. IDEF0 helps the analyst represent
activities, inputs and outputs to and from those activities,
controls or constraints on the activities, and mechanisms
which perform the activities. From the IDEF0 model we
generated a data dictionary consisting of the entities that
are the inputs, outputs, and controls of the activities in
the model. We used these to clef'me the object-oriented
architecture of the AMgr.
AMgr Architecture
Major AMgr objects include System Agents, Actor
Agents, Goal Agents, Function Agents, an Agenda
Agent, and an Agenda Manager Interface. Each agent is
a simple knowledge-based object representing the
corresponding elements of the cockpit environment. As a
representative of such an element, the Agent's purpose is
to maintain timely information about it and to perform
processing that will facilitate AMgt. An Agent's
declarative knowledge is represented using instance
variables. Its procedural knowledge is represented using
Smalltalk methods. The categories of Agents are
described below and the overall architecture is illustrated
in Figure 1.
The purpose of a System Agent (SA) is to help the pilot
(and the AMgr itself) maintain situational awareness.
Each SA represents a system in the simulated
environment, such as the aircraft, the fuel system, or
even a pilot, and receives information from that system
via an inter-process connection called a socket. An SA's
declarative knowledge includes the past, current, and
projected future state of the corresponding system. Its
procedural knowledge includes how to project future
state and how to recognize system abnormalities. This
means that an SA maintains not only current and past
system state information, but can also be called upon by
other agents (see below) to project future state
information in order to anticipate future events. It can
also recognize system faults and instantiate Goal Agents
(see below) for goals to correct them.
Actor Agents (AAs) recognize actors' goals, implicitly
and explicitly, and make them known to the rest of the
AMgr. An AA represents an actor, such as a pilot or an
automation device. As declarative knowledge, each AA
maintains information about the current state of the
corresponding actor, including his/her/its agenda. AA
procedural knowledge covers how to obtain state
information.
A very important AA is the Flightcrew (or pilot) Agent.
The Flighterew Agent has a serial connection to a
Verbex automatic speech recognition (ASR) system.
This allows the pilot to declare his/her goals explicitly by
short vocal utterances. The intent is to be able to
recognize pilot goals primarily by monitoring air traffic
control (ATC) clearance acknowledgements. That is,
when a pilot acknowledges ATC clearances, he/she
typically repeats the clearance back to the controller. The
Flightcrew Agent, using the Verbex system, interprets
these as pilot goals for the control of the aircraft. For
example, heading, altitude, airspeed, and waypoint goals
are declared as the pilot verbally acknowledges ATC
clearances by repeating them back to the controller (the
experimenter, in our study). The Verbex system
"eavesdrops" on the pilot and sends a coded form of the
utterance to the Flightcrew Agent which translates it and
declares a goal by creating an instance of a Goal Agent.
The purpose of Goal Agents (GAs) is to maintain
information about all actors' goals. A GA represents an
actor's goal, such as one to descend to and maintain an
altitude of 9,000 fl or one to crossfeed fuel from one fuel
tank to another to correct an imbalance. A GA has
declarative knowledge about the state of the goal to be
achieved (,pending, active, or terminated) and whether or
not it is achieved. A GA's procedural knowledge
includes how to determine if the goal is achieved and
how to determine whether or not its goal is consistent
with the goals of other GAs. Each GA is associated with
one Function Agent.
The purpose of a Function Agent (FA) is to monitor
whether its goal is being pursued in a correct and timely
manner. An FA represents a function, which is an
activity performed to achieve a goal. Each FA has
declarative knowledge about the state of its function
(pending, active, or terminated, like the goal) and the
status of its function (how well the function is being
performed and whether or not goal achievement is
likely). FA procedural knowledge includes how to assess
function state and status and how to assess goal and
function priority based on prevailing conditions. FAs
not only assess the current status of functions, but also
use the prediction capabilities of SAs to project future
function status.
The single Agenda Agent is the executive Agent which
coordinates the activities of all other Agents. Its
declarative knowledge consists of the current set of GAs
and FAs. Its procedural knowledge includes what to do
when a new GA is introduced (e.g., check it against other
GAs for compatibility), what to do when a GA changes
state (e.g., move it to another part of the Agenda), and
how to develop overall priority ratings for the
Goal/Function Agents based on importance and urgency.
Operation
As the simulator runs it sends state data to the AMgr,
whose SAs maintain a situation model of the simulated
aircraft and its environment. AAs monitor real or
simulated actors, detect or infer goals, and instantiate
GAs. GAs look for conflicts with each other and monitor
SAs to see if the goals are achieved. FAs monitor the
progress -- if any - made in achieving their associated
goals. The Agenda Agent prioritizes GAs and FAs and
keeps track of goal conflicts. The AgendaManager
Interface presents this agenda information to the pilot.
Pilot Interface
The AgendaManager Interface (AMI) consists of
display formats for presenting agenda information to the
pilot. R is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows what the
pilot would see in the possible (but hopefully, very
unlikely) situation depicted in the diagram in Figure 1.
Each line on the AMI is a message concerning a GA and
FA pair, consisting of the name of the goal and a status
comment if a problem exists or is anticipated.
In the situation underlying both figures, the Fuel System
Agent has detected an out-of-balance condition between
the left and right fuel tanks and has instantiated a GA for
the goal to remedy it, and the pilot has correctly begun
crossfeeding fuel. The corresponding FA has determined
that this function is being performed satisfactorily, but
will require attention later to terminate fuel crossfeeding,
so the AMgr message for it is white, which denotes a
satisfactory status.
The pilot has received an air traffic control clearance to
reduce speed to 240 knots Oct), maintain the present
heading of 070 degrees, and descend to an altitude of
9,000 ft. He/she has verbally acknowledged this
clearance and the AMgr has recognized these aviate
(aircraft control) goals and instantiated GAs and FAs.
Speed is currently too high and is not decreasing, so the
AMgr speed message is amber and its comment notes the
problem. The airplane's current heading is 070 degrees,
so the AMgr's message for this is gray, with no
explanatory comments, so as not to distract.
Although the aircraft is correctly descending towards
9, 000 ft, the pilot has inadvertently set the autoflight
system to descend to 8,000 ft. This goal conflict has been
detected by the two GAs and is signalled by an amber-
colored message.
Two other system faults have occurred. There is a f'h'e in
the left engine and the pressure in the center hydraulic
subsystem has dropped below an acceptable level, and
corresponding SAs have detected them and instantiated
GAs for goals to correct them. As the engine fire
condition is critical, its message is displayed in red at the
very top of the display. The hydraulic system fault is
intermediate in priority between the flight control goals
and the fuel balance goal, it is displayed in amber
between them.
AgendaManager Evaluation
Objective
The purpose of the experiment was to determine any
differences in AMgt performance between the use of the
AMgr and the use of a model (developed in our lab) of a
conventional monitoring and alerting system called the
Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS).
Method
A total often airline pilots participated in the
experiment, with the fast two being used to refine the
scenarios and identify and correct problems with
software and procedures.
Prior to the experiment each subject was given a brief
introduction to the study, filled out a pre-experiment
questionnaire, and read and signed an informed consent
document. The following forty minutes were used to
train the Verbex speech recognition system to recognize
the subject's voice so that altitude, speed, and heading
goals could be determined fi'om ATC clearance
acknowledgements. After a short break the subject
learned how to fly the flight simulator using the Mode
Control Panel (MCP - the autoflight system interface),
recognize and correct experimenter-induced goal
conflicts and subsystem faults, interpret EICAS and
AMgr displays, and alter programmed flightpaths. After
a lunch break, the subject flew two 30 minute scenarios
(one with EICAS, one with the AMgr), separated by a
five minute break. Upon the completion of the
experiment the subject answered a post-experiment
questionnaire.
The primary factor investigated in the experiment was
monitoring and alerting system condition (whether
AMgr or EICAS was used). The experimental design
was balanced in regard to the monitoring and alerting
system used and the scenario (1 or 2).
We collected data for each subject on:
1. how correctly the subject prioritized within
concurrent subsystem functions;
2. the average subsystem fault correction time;
3. the average time to properly program the autoflight
system,
4. the percentage of goal conflicts detected and
corrected;
5. the average time to resolve goal conflicts;
6. how correctly the subject prioritized concurrent
subsystem and aviate functions;
7. the average number of unsatisfactory functions at
any time;
8. the percentage of time all functions were
satisfactory; and
9. the subject's rating of the effectiveness ofeach
monitoring and alerting system: -5 (great hindrance)
to +5 (great help).
Results
Table I shows the results obtained for each of these
variables. The fast three, within subsystem correct
prioritization, subsystem fault correction time, and
autoflight programming time, show no significant
statistical differences (p-values > 0.05) across the
AMgr/EICAS conditions. This is critical for the
interpretation of the results in that it supports the
hypothesis of the AMgr being the only cause of
significant differences. For example, within subsystem
prioritization performance does not differ between the
two conditions. Also, once a subsystem fault is detected,
the process of correcting it is identical between the two
conditions. Programming the autoflight system is
identical in both conditions. However, we did observe a
minor practice effect for each subject between the two
scenarios, i.e., they showed significant improvement in
programming the autoflight system.
A key objective of the AMgr is to support the pilot in
recognizing goal conflicts and to help resolve those in a
timely manner. The next two variables, goal conflicts
corrected percentage and goal conflict resolution time,
directly reflect this, and the results clearly indicate how
successful the AMgr condition achieved it. Any time a
goal conflict existed, the AMgr helped the subject
identify this conflict (100%) whereas with EICAS, the
subjects only identified 70% of the conflicts. Also, with
the AMgr the subjects were able to resolve the conflict
nearly 19 seconds faster. This may have helped them
achieve an overall lower level of unsatisfactory functions
(AMgr: 0.64; EICAS: 0.85) by making more time
available to them.
It is crucial for the pilot to recognize that primary flight
control functions (i.e., aviate functions) are usually more
critical than subsystem related fimctions. The AMgr
clearly showed its strength by helping the pilots in 72%
of the cases to correctly prioritize. With EICAS the pilots
only achieved 46%. Last, but not least, with the AMgr
the subjects were able to achieve a significantly higher
percentage where all functions were performed
satisfactorily (AMgr: 65%; EICAS: 52%).
4
Independentof how well an individual can perform
under a given condition, it is also important that
subjectively he or she finds this condition acceptable.
Based on our results, the subjects' effectiveness ratings
strongly support the AMgr (4.8 vs. 2.).
Discussion
The results of our investigation clearly suggest that the
concept of the AgendaManager can have a very
significant impact on flight crew performance, helping
them in successfully managing goals, functions, and
resources. In that, the AMgr represents a software tool
which shows the potential for significantly reducing the
probability of undetected flight crew errors. It directly
builds on the success of existing crew monitoring and
alerting systems (such as EICAS) by including pilot
intent logic [6]. Given the industry's objective of
significantly reducing the number of commercial
transport accidents, the AMgr must be seen as one of the
facilitating tools in this effort.
Further Research
Based on our results, we believe that there are several
research paths to be explored. For example, the AMgr
should be evaluated in a more realistic scenarios in a
full-mission simulator. This is necessary to be sure that
the effects that we saw in this evaluation were not merely
artifacts of the simplified part-task environment.
During AMgr development, we experimented with a
goal communication method that integrated overt
communication (via clearance acknowledgement) and
covert communication (via script-based intent
inferencing) [3]. Although we chose to include only
overt goal communication in the current version of the
AMgr, covert methods offer the potential of low pilot
workload and should be further investigated.
An enhancement we are currently exploring is Fuzzy
Function Agents (FFAs). Function Agents in the current
version of the AMgr use conventional (crisp) logic to
assess how well functions are being performed. In some
cases (for example, aviate functions) fuzzy logic may be
more appropriate, so we are developing FFAs to provide
more human-like function assessments. Through
interviews with pilots we extracted fuzzy if-then rules to
model human function assessment. Then we fine-tuned
the rules with the application of a genetic algorithm
which minimized the discrepancy between human and
machine assessments of sample scenarios. Although a
preliminary evaluation of the FFAs has revealed
performance comparable to that of human pilots, the
method needs further development.
Although the AMgr has potential as an operational aid,
its near-term benefits may be realized in other ways. For
example, with suitable modifications, the AMgr could be
embedded in a part-task trainer to facilitate AMgt
training. Another possible role is as a research tool. With
relatively minor changes the AMgr could be used to
capture AMgt data on-line in full-mission simulator
experiments. In fact, the greatest value of the AMgr may
be in this capacity, helping us understand the
phenomenon of Agenda Management better.
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Table I
AgendaManager evaluation results, mean values (all times in seconds).
Response variable AgendaManager EICAS p-value
within subsystem correct prioritization 100% 100% NA
subsystem fault correction time 19.5 19.6 .9809
autoflight system programming time 7.0 5.9 .1399
goal conflicts corrected percentage
goal conflict resolution time
subsystem/aviate correct prioritization
average number of unsatisfactory functions
percentage of time all functions satisfactory
100%
34.7
72%
0.64
65%
70%
53.6
46%
0.85
52%
.0572
.0821
.0308
.0466
.0254
subject effectiveness rating (-5 to 5) 4.8 2.5 .0006
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Introduction
Commercial air transportation has an admirable safety record, yet each year hundreds of lives and hundreds of
millions of dollars worth of property are lost in air crashes in the United States alone. About two-thirds of these
aircraR accidems are caused, in part, by pilot error. Many of these errorsareerrorsinperforming fhghtdeck (or
cockpit) functions, others are errors in managing flightdeck goals and the functions to achieve those goals. This
website describes the development of a theory of flightdeck activity management and the development and
evaluation of a prototype computational aids to facilitate it.
Background
Multitasking
The modem flightdeck (or cockpit) is a multitask environment. The flighterew (whether one or more pilots) is
constantly faced with multiple, concurrent, competing,, often conflicting goals to accomplish and therefore must
engage in multiple activities to accomplish them. As most pilots are aware, it is not only difficult to successfully
accomplish such goals, it is often even more challenging to manage the activities directed towards them. We
discovered this ourselves as we developed and evaluated the Task Support System (TSS), part of an experimental
avionics system to aidmilitarypilots.
Over the years, #lots have developed a priority scheme to facilitate this management of flightdeck activities:
1. aviate to keep the airplane in the air and pointed in the fight direction;
2. navigate to determine where to go and how to get there;
3. communicate with the rest of the flightcrew and with air traffic control; and
4. manage systems, like engines, fuel systems, and hydraulic systems.
Cockpit Task Management
Although the process of managing Rightdeek activities is intuitively well-understood by pilots, we formalized it in a
preliminary, normative theory, which we called Cockpit Task Management (CTM). Briefly, a goal is a desired
2 of 7 6/30/97 9:18 AM
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behavior of the aircraft and a task is an activity performed to achieve it. As there are generally multiple, concurrent
tasks to attend to on the flightdeck, the flightcrew must create an initial list of tasks to perform then continually
• assess the current situation;
• activate new tasks in response to recent events;
• assess task status to determine ffeach task is being performed satisfactorily;
• terminate tasks with achieved or unachievable goals,
• assess task resource requirements (human and machine);
• prioritize active tasks;
• allocate resources to tasks in order of priority (initiating, interrupting, and resuming them, as ne_._ssary);
and
• update the task list.
To better understand the nature and significance of CTM, we conducted three empirical studies: a review of
National Transportation Safety Board airctaR accident reports, a review of Aviation Safety Reporting System
aircraR incident reports, and a simulator experiment. In the accident report study, we determined that CTM errors
occurred in 76 (23 per cent) of the 324 accidents we reviewed. We found CTM errors in 231 (49 per cent) of the
470 incident reports we reviewed. In the simulator study we found that CTM performance was inversely related to
workload. We concluded that CTM is significant to flight safety.
The Cockpit Task Management System
Although there are many potentially effective responses to this, we chose to investigate the use of computational
aids to facilitate CTM. Our first such aid (not counting the TSS, which actually preceded the development of the
concept of CTM) was the Cockpit Task Management System (CTMS). Our goals for the CTMS were that it
should help the pilot initiate, monitor, prioritize, and terminate tasks. To achieve these goals, we determined that the
CTMS should provide information about task state (upcoming, active, terminated), status (satisfactory or
unsatisfactory performance), and priority.
We implemented the CTMS using Smalltalk, an object-oriented computer programming language. We used
concepts of object-oriented design and distributed artificial intelligence in the CTMS implementation, where aircra_
subsystems and flight tasks were represented by conceptual software units referred to as agents. In the CTMS,
aircraft subsystems and pilot tasks were represented by system agents (SAs) and task agents (TAs), respectively.
Each TA used information from SAs and its own procedural knowledge to determine the state of its task: latent (not
imminent), upcoming (imminent), in progress, suggested (requiring immediate attention), or finished. Task status
(satisfactory or unsatisfactory) was determined in a similar way. The CTMS display provided state, status, and
priority information about each task.
We performed a part-task simulator experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of the CTMS in facilitating CTM
performance. Twelve subjects flew a part-task simulator under both aided (with CTMS) and unaided (without the
CTMS) conditions. When subjects flew with the assistance of the CTMS, the mean task misprioritization rate was
reduced by 41 per cent, the mean subject response time was reduced by 18 per cent, mean unsatisfactory aircraft
control was reduced by 24 per cent, and the average number of incomplete tasks during simulator flights was
reduced by 82 per cent.
Agenda Management
Our theory of CTM, as originally formulated, failed to address two important issues. First, human pilots are
coming to depend more and more on automated aids, such as autopilots and centralized monitoring and alerting
systems, to aid them in the monitoring and control of the aircraR and its subsystems. As machines perform certain
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goal-directed flightdeck activities, it is more appropriate to speak of those activities as functions since, technically
speaking a task is a function performed by a human. Second, with both humans and machines performing
flightdeck functions, there is a potential for conflicting goals. Two recent aircraft accidents illustrate such goal
conflicts. In 1994 in a China Airlines Airbus A300 on approach to _ Japan, the flightcrew inadvertently
initia_ an antoflight system go-around maneuver while trying to continue the landing. The goal conflict between
the flightcrew and the antoflight system caused an out-of-trim condition that resulted in a stall and crash which
killed 264 persons. In an American Airlines Boeing 757 on approach to Call Columbia in 1995, the flightcrew
accepted an air traffic control clearance to fly direct to a designated navigational fix. Thoy inadvertently configured
the aircraft's flight management system to fly the airplane to a different fix. This goal conflict was not detected in
time to prevent the aircraft from crashing into mountainous terrain, killing 159 persons.
To address these issues, which were clearly related to the original theory of CTM, we expanded the theory. Since an
'agenda' is a list of things to do, we called the new concept Agenda Management (AMgt). To formalize the
concept, we developed a model of AMgt using IDEF0, a functional modeling language. IDEF0, whose name stands
for ICAM (Integrated Computer Aided Manufacturing) DEFinition language 0, is a graphical modeling language.
IDEF0 diagrams consist of hoxes representing activities and arrows representing inputs and outputs to and from
those activities, c_mtrols or c_-tmims on the activities, and mechanisms that perform the activities. In an IDEF0
model of a process, each box represents an activity or function, which transforms its inputs to its outputs, subject to
certain controls or constraints, by means of a set of mechanisms. The following summary theory of AMgt is based
on the model.
An actor is an entity that does something in that it can control or change the state of the aircraft and/or its
subsystems. Pilots are human actors; machine actors include autoflight and flight management systems. A goal is a
representation (mental, electronic, or even mechanical) of an actor's intent to change the state of the aircraft or one
of its subsystems in some significant way, or to maintain or keep the aircraft or one of its subsystems in some state.
For example, a pilot might have a goal to descend to an altitude of 9,000 ft, a goal to maintain the current heading
of 270 ° , and a goal to crossfeed fuel to correct a fuel system imbalance, ff configured properly, the autoflight
system in this example would also have a goal to descend to 9,000 ft and a goal to hold 270 ° . Goals come about as
a result of planning and decision making in the case of human actors, and computation or human input, in the case
of machine actors.
A function is an activity performed by an actor to achieve a goal. That activity may directly achieve the goal or it
may produce sub-goals which, when achieved by performing sub-functions, satisfy the conditions of the original
goal. Actors use resources to perform functions. Human actor resources include eyes, hands, memory, and
attention; machine actor resources include input and output channels, memory, and processor cycles. Other machine
resources include flight controls, electronic flight instrument system displays, and radios. In general, several goals
might exist at any time, so several functions must be performed concurrently to achieve them. Actors must be
assigned to perform those functions and resources must be allocated to enable them. An agenda then is a set of
goals to be achieved and a set of functions to achieve those goals.
Agenda Management (AMgt) is a high-level flightdeck function performed cooperatively by flightdeck actors,
which involves two sub-functious:
1. Goal management is the process of
1. recognizing or inferring the goals of all flightdeck actors;
2. canceling goals that have been achieved or are no longer relevant;
3. identifying and resolving conflicts between goals; and
4. prioritizing goals consistently with safe and effective aircraft operation.
2. Function management is the process of
1. initiating functions to achieve goals;
2. assigning actors to perform fun_ons;
3. assessing the status of each function (whether or not it is being performed satisfactorily and on time);
4. prioritizing those run,ons based on goal priority and function status; and
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5. allocating resources to be used to perform functions based on function priority.
At any point in time, AMgt performance is satisfactory if and only if:
.
2.
3.
there arc no goal conflicts;
all goals and functions arc properly prioritized; and
either
1. performance of all functions is satisfactory, or
2. if that is not possible, actors are actively engaged in bringing the highest priority unsatisfactory
functions up to a satisfactory level of performance.
The AgendaManager
From the results of our CTM studies and our analysis of the Nagoya, Cali, and other aircraft accidents, we have
concluded that AMgt - and specifically the failure to perform AMgt satisfactorily - is a significant factor in flight
safety. The objectives of our most recent research task were to develop and to evaluate an experimental
computational aid to facilitate AMgt. We call this aid the AgendaManager (AMgr).
Simulator
The part-task flight simulator that provides the context for the AMgr models a generic, twin engine transport
aircra_.It is built from components developed at the NASA Langley and NASA Ames Research centers and in our
own lab. It tuns on one or two Silicon Graphics Indigo 2 computers and provides a simplified aerodynamic model
(Langley), autoflight system (Langley), Hight Management System (Langley), primary flight displays (Ames),
Mode Control Panel (Ames), and system models and system synoptic displays (OSU). The software is written in C,
FORTRAN, and SmaUtalk (VisualWorks 2.5).
Architecture and Function
From the IDEF0 model of AMgt we generated a data dictionary consisting of the entities that are the inputs,
outputs, and controls of the activities in the model. We used this information to define the object-oriented
architecture of the AMgr and the functions of its components. Major AMgr objects include System Agents, Actor
Agents, Goal Agents, Function Agents, an Agenda Agent, and an Agenda Manager Interface. Each Agent is a
simple knowledge-based object representing the corresponding elements of the cockpit environment. As a
representative of such an dement, the Agent's purpose is to maintain timely information about it and to perform
processing that will facilitate AMgt. An Agent's declarative knowledge is represented using instance variables. Its
procedural knowledge is represented using Smalltalk methods.
System Agents (SAs) represent systems modeled in the flight simulator, remembering their state and recognizing
abnormal conditions such as malfunctions. System Agents provide situation information to the other AMgr Agents.
Actor Agents (AAs) recognize actor (pilot or antoflight system) goals and instantiate Goal Agents. The Flightcrew
Agent recognizes pilot goals by means of a Verbex VAT31 automatic speech recognition system as the pilot
acknowledges air traffic control clearances. Goal Agents (GAS) represent actor goals. They detect conflicts and
determine when goals are achieved. Function Agents (FAS) monitor the progress of activities directed towards the
goals, noting whether that progress is satisfactory or unsatisfactory. The single Agenda Agent contains and
coordinates the other Agents, introducing new Agents to its collections, checking GAs against each other to identify
conflicts, and ordering Goal and Function Agents by priority. The AgendaManager Interface displays AMgt
information to the pilot.
Operation
AS the simulator runs it sends state data to the AMgr, whose SAs maintain a situation model of the simulated
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airera_ and its environment. AAs monitor real or simulated actors, detect or infer goals, and instanti_ GAs. GAs
look for conflicts with each other and monitor SAs to see ffthe goals are achieved. FAs monitor the progress - if
any - made in achieving their associated goals. The Agenda Agent prioritizes GAs and FAs and keeps track of goal
conflicts. The AgendaManager Interface presents this agenda information to the pilot.
Evaluation
We conducted an evaluation study to compare the effectiveness of the AMgr in facilitating AMgt with that of a
model of an existing aiding system called the Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS). Eight airline
pilots flew the simulator in 30-minute scenarios under two conditions, one using the AMgr, the other using EICAS.
We measured several types of perform ce, including how well subjects detected and resolved goal conflicts and
how well they priorifized goals and functions. We also asked the subjects to rate the perceived effectiveness of the
two systems in aiding their performance.
For all measures where AMgr and EICAS were functionally equivalent, there was no statistically significant
difference in subject performance between the _on with the AMgr and that with EICAS. For all measures
where AMgr and EICAS functionality differed significantly, AMgt performance was better with the AMgr than
with EICAS, and the subjects rated AMgr effectiveness higher than EICAS effectiveness. All such differences were
statistically significant at the alpha = 0.1 level. Four were statistically significant at the alpha = 0.05 level.
Discussion
AgendaManager Performance
The first set of findings (that there was no difference in measures related to functionally similar capabilities) is
suggestive evidence that there was no experimenter-induced bias in favor of the AMgr. The second set of findings is
strong evidence that the AMgr actually facilitated AMgt in the context of this experiment.
We must, however, be cautious concerning any inferences made from this finding. The fidelity of the simulator was
fairly low and the fact that we observed a period effect (which could include learning) is an indication that perhaps
the subjects did not receive adequate training. The simulator was a one-pilot version whereas all of our subjects fly
on a two-pilot flightdeek. Finally, the success of the AMgr depends to a very large extent on its ability to correctly
recognize the pilot's goals. In five to 10 percent of our subjects' goals the automatic speech recognition system (an
old model) did not recognize the goal from the subject's utterance and the Goal Agent had to be instamiated by the
experimenter.
Nevertheless, our findings are suggestive that AMgt performance, which is significant to flight safety, can be
enhanced by means of a computational aid. Especially in light of recent advances in amomatic speech recognition
technology and the Federal Aviation Administration's plans to introduce datalink technology to deliver clearances to
aircraft, we believe that further development of the AMgr is warranted.
Related Systems
The relationship of the AMgr to several existing aiding systems should be noted. First, the AMgr can be considered
a logical extension of the Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) used in present-generation Boeing
aircraft, and similar centralized monitoring and alerting systems in other aircraft. EICAS and related systems have
been very successful and well received by the operational community. However, they are limited in the extent tO
which they can tailor the information to the phase of flight and they are not capable of merging the information in
case of multiple failures. Of much greater significance is that little or no effort is made to consider the flighterew's
intent at any given moment. The AMgr builds on the success of EICAS by adopting EICAS display philosophy and
coding and overcomes the latter limitation by basing its operation on the pilot's declared goals.
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The AMgr also has some aff_ty to Pilot's Associate, RotorcraR Pilot's Associate, and CASSY (Cockpit Assistant
System), all of which are aiding systems designed to offer integrative and active assistance to the pilot. The AMgr
is distinguished fi'om these and similar systems in that it does not attempt to be a general, active aid. Rather, the
AMgr focuses on passively assisting the flighterew in performing AMgt by supplementing human memory and
attention, not action.
Further Research
Work remains to be done on the AMgr and the concept of AMgt. For example, the AMgr should be evaluated in a
more realistic scenarios in a full-mission simulator. This is necessary to be sure that the effects that we saw in this
evaluation were not merely artifacts of the simplified part-task environment.
During AMgr development, we experimented with a goal communication method that integrated overt
communication (via clearance acknowledgement) and covert communication (via script-based intent inferencing).
Althoughwe chosetoincludeonlyovertgoalcommunicationinthecurrentversionoftheAMgr, covertmethods
offerthepotentialoflow pilotworkloadand shouldbe furtherinvestigated.
An enhancement we are currently exploring is Fuzzy Function Agents (FFAs). Function Agents in the current
version of the AMgr use conventional (crisp) logic to assess how well functions are being performed. In some cases
(for example, aviate functions) fuzzy logic may be more appropriate, so we are developing FFAs to provide more
human-like function assessments. Through interviews with pilots we extracted fiu.zy if-then rules to model human
function assessment. Then we fine-tuned the rules with the application of a genetic algorithm which minimized the
discrepancy between human and machine assessments of sample scenarios. Although a preliminary evaluation of
the FFAs has revealed performance comparable to that of human pilots, the method needs further development.
Although the AMgr has potential as an operational aid, its near-term benefits may be realized in other ways. For
example, with suitable modifications, the AMgr could be embedded in a part-task trainer to facilitate AMgt
training. Another possible role is as a research tool. With relatively minor changes the AMgr could be used to
capture AMgt data on-line in full-mission simulator experiments. In fact, the greatest value of the AMgr may be in
this capacity, helping us understand the phenomenon of Agenda Management better.
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